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Taxing Nonprofits out of Business
Diane L. Fahey*

Abstract
In the last twenty years, the number of nonprofit organizations has
exploded; there are more than 1.2 million organizationsregisteredwith the
Internal Revenue Service. Donations and government grants have
decreased, while at the same time, nonprofits are facing increasing
demands on their services. As a result, nonprofitorganizationshave been
forced to devise new strategiesfor acquiringfunds.
Some nonprofitorganizationshave resortedto rentingtheir mailinglists to
businesses and other nonprofit organizations and have licensed their
names and logos to be displayed on affinity credit cards offered by banks
to consumers. Nonprofit organizationshave argued that these funds are
not subject to the unrelated business income tax and considerthem to be
exempt as royalties. The InternalRevenue Service, and initiallythe courts,
disagreed.
Revenuefrom these two sources should continue to be classifiedas royalty
income. These royalties operate in a fashion analogous to traditional
mineral rights royalties, which are exempt from the unrelated business
income tax. Mineral rights royalties are divided into a taxable working
interest, which bearsthe risks and benefits of the venture, and the exempt
investment interest held by the nonprofit. These new royalties can be
divided the same way into these two interests. In fact, it can be arguedthat
this approachcould be applied to other income items to determine if they
should be exemptfrom the unrelated business income tax.
Further,mailing list rentalsandaffinity creditcard licensesdo not contain
even the potential to harm competition. However, taxing this income may
* Visiting Assistant Professor, Vermont Law School; formerly an attorney-advisor at the
United States Tax Court; LL.M., Tax, Georgetown University; J.D., Cleveland-Marshall; B.A.,
Cleveland State University.
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well hindercertain nonprofitsfrom functioning and discriminateinfavor
of older, more moneyed organizations.
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L Introduction
Imagine a not-for-profit organization, such as a law school, organized to
engage in the charitable purpose of providing education for students. Assume
that, under federal tax law, neither tuition revenues nor contributions to the
school are taxed to the school. What if that school also was to run an unrelated
commercial business, such as a macaroni factory? If it was not taxed on the
revenue from that company, the law school's macaroni company would have a
competitive advantage over other similar companies, shrinking their profit
margins and perhaps driving them out of business.
This hypothetical may seem unrealistic, but it is grounded in reality. In
the 1940s, a group of individuals wished to benefit New York University,
which had a small endowment, a large enrollment, and needed additional funds
to cover its costs. 1 These benefactors donated the stock of the C.F. Mueller Co.
to New York University. 2 At the time, C.F. Mueller was the country's largest
manufacturer of macaroni.3
In addition to the C.F. Mueller Co., New York University acquired three
other companies: Howes Leather Company; American Limoges China, Inc.;
and the Ramsey Corporation, a piston ring manufacturer. a New York
University was not alone. After World War H, a number of colleges acquired
commercial real estate that included department stores, warehouses, office
buildings, and apartment buildings. 5 Frequently, these colleges acquired the
real estate by borrowing the purchase price and then repaying the loan with the
tax-free rental income.6

1. See C.F. Mueller Co. v. Comm'r, 14 T.C. 922, 923 (1950) (describing briefly the
university's financial condition).
2. Id. at 923-25 (explaining how the benefactors donated the stock to the university).
3. Note, The Macaroni Monopoly: The Developing Concept of Unrelated Business
Income of Exempt Organizations,81 HARv. L. REv. 1280, 1281 (1968).
4. See Donald L. Sharpe, UnfairBusiness Competition and the Tax on Income Destined
for Charity: Forty-Six Years Later, 3 FLA. TAx REv. 367, 382 (1996) (outlining New York
University's acquisition of these three businesses).
5. See id. at 382-83 (explaining how colleges and universities regularly acquired such
companies).
6. See id. (explaining how educational organizations financed these purchases); Estate of
Howes v. Comm'r, 30 T.C. 909,911-15 (1958) (describing New York University's acquisition
of Howes Leather Co. and its use of debt to finance the purchase).

62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 547 (2005)
By 1950, the public outcry over nonprofit organizations' commercial
activities galvanized Congress to take action.7 New York University's activities
were particularly troubling to certain members of Congress, causing
Representative John Dingell to warn that unless action was taken, "the
macaroni monopoly will be in the hands of the universities ....Eventually all
the noodles produced in 8this country will be produced by corporations held or
created by universities.",
While the Revenue Act of 1950, containing the proposed unrelated
business income tax provisions, 9 was pending, Congress held hearings and
heard testimony from both the business community and representatives from
colleges and universities.' 0 Subsequently, the provisions were enacted and are
still a part of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C. or Code). 1' Thus, today, a law
school that started or acquired a macaroni company would have to pay tax on
the pasta profits, much as a commercial enterprise would.
Since then, nonprofit organizations have engaged in other activities that
are harder to classify as "business" in the sense the drafters of the 1950s'
legislation conceived it. In recent years some nonprofits have availed
themselves of two increasingly popular means for raising funds: (1) renting
their donor mailing lists to commercial and other nonprofit organizations and
to banks that issue credit cards
(2) licensing the organization's name and logo
12
bearing that name and logo (affinity cards).
This is not an insignificant or unimportant issue. Within the last twenty
years, the number of nonprofit organizations has burgeoned. As of 1995, there
were approximately 1.2 million groups registered with the Internal Revenue
Service.1 3 Their numbers include the Salvation Army, the United Ancient
Order of Druids, Toastmasters, the Oilfield Chili Appreciation Society,
Alcoholics Anonymous, the Assembly of Wicca, Cleveland Clinic Hospital, the

7. See Note, supra note 3, at 1281 (explaining how the Mueller Co. situation prompted
Congress to act).
8. Revenue Revision of 1950: HearingsBefore the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
81st Cong. 579-80 (1950) [hereinafter HearingsBefore House Comm.].
9. Revenue Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 64-814, §§ 301, 331, 64 Stat. 906, 947, 957,
(codified as amended at I.R.C. §§ 502-514 (1954)).
10. See generally HearingsBefore House Comm., supra note 8.
11. I.R.C. §§ 511-513 (2000).
12. See infra Part III.B (explaining how a typical affinity card program works).
13. Alicia Meckstroth & Paul Arnsberger, 20- Year Review ofthe Nonprofit Sector, 19751995, STATISTICS OF INCOME BuLLEm, Fall 1998, at 150, available at http://www.
irs.gov/taxstats/articlefO,,id=l 17505,00.html (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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Red Cross, and the Columbia Ultimate Frisbee Association.' 4 In 1995, the
307,384 exempt organizations that filed tax returns reported $1.6 trillion in
assets and more than $8 billion in revenues.1 5 In 1997, only 19.9% of the
nonprofit sector's funds came from private contributions; fees for services,
government grants, and16profits from sales and investments accounted for the
balance of the revenue.
For years, small businesses in particular have complained about the
In 2000, exempt
increasingly commercial activities of nonprofits.17
organizations reported gross unrelated business income of $8.4 billion and
unrelated business taxable income of $1.4 billion on which they paid taxes of
$405.8 million.' 8 With the recent scandals involving charities that were
established in the wake of September 11 th and charities established for tax
avoidance purposes, Congress once again is subjecting nonprofits' activities to
closer scrutiny. 19 Congress may consider expanding the scope of the unrelated
business income tax to include income from mailing list rentals and affinity
card licensing activities.20
This Article argues that contrary to how it may seem at first blush,
subjecting mailing list rental and affinity card income to the unrelated business
14. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, IRS PUBLICATION
ORGANIZATIONS (2004).
15.

78, CUMULATIVE

LIST OF §

501(c)(3)

MARGARET RILEY, UNRELATED BUSINESS INCOME OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS:

HIGHLIGHTS OF 1995 AND A REVIEW OF 1991-1995, at 171 (1999). Dollar amounts are adjusted
to reflect constant dollars.
16. VIRGINIA A. HODGKINSON ET AL., THE NEW NONPROFIT ALMANAC AND DESK
REFERENCE 156, 159, 190 (2002) (setting out the sources of income for the nonprofit sector in
1997).
17. See Owens Discusses UnrelatedBusiness Income Issues, Restructuring,TAX NOTES
TODAY, Apr. 26, 1999, LEXIS, 1999 TNT 79-2 (discussing small business complaints about
nonprofit commercial activities). See generally Carolyn D. Wright, Tide Could Be Shifting on
IRS PursuitofAffinity CardUBI, 20 EXEMPT. ORG. TAX REV. 203 (May 1998) (outlining briefly
Owens's speech).
18. See Margaret Riley, UnrelatedBusiness Income Tax Returns, 2000, with a Decadein
Review, 1991-2000, IRS STAT. OF INCOME BULL., Spring 2004, at 135-37 (summarizing tax
figures from fiscal year 2000). The $405.8 million in unrelated business income tax is adjusted
for certain credits and other taxes, resulting in $402.9 million in total tax. Id.
19. Today's Tax Highlights, TAX NOTES TODAY, June 23,2004, LEXIS, 2004 TNT 121-H
(summarizing Internal Revenue Service Commissioner Mark Everson's appearance before the
Senate Finance Committee, and recounting some of the abusive practices that have been
discovered, such as excessive compensation to executives, and "charity involvement in
transactions that benefit taxable entities").
20. Today's Tax Highlights,TAX NOTES TODAY, July 2, 2004, LEXIS, 2004 TNT 128-8
(recounting reports from aides to the Senate Finance Committee that the Committee is preparing
to work on legislation that would establish reforms for nonprofits based on recommendations
contained in a discussion draft of proposed reforms).
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income tax will not protect competition, but may well cause hardship for taxexempt organizations that are unable to fund fully their activities from
traditional sources of revenue such as donations and fees. This Article argues
that, if these activities constitute the operation of a trade or business, they do
not pose a threat to competition and therefore should remain exempt from the
unrelated business income tax.
Following this introduction, Part II explains how the unrelated business
income tax operates, recounts the events that led to its enactment, and surveys
the various attempts to define "trade or business" and the difficulties in
applying that term to the nonprofit sector. Part 111 traces the courts' progression
from subjecting affinity card and mailing list rental to taxation as income
derived from a trade or business to income exempt from taxation as a royalty.
Part IV considers how the exemption for royalties derived from mineral rights
can be applied by analogy to income derived from these activities. Finally, Part
V examines how these activities neither divert a nonprofit's resources from its
exempt purpose nor cause harm to competition. Therefore, the Article
concludes that these activities should not be subject to the unrelated business
income tax.
IL Charities,Unrelated Business, and Taxation
A. I.R.C. Sections 511-513: How They Operate
I.R.C. Section 511 states that a tax will be imposed on the unrelated
business income of tax-exempt organizations.2 1 I.R.C. Section 512(a) defines
"unrelated business taxable income" as the gross income derived by an exempt
organization from the operation of an unrelated trade or business, less
deductions allowed, and subject to certain modification contained in I.R.C.
Section 512(b), discussed below.22 I.R.C. Section 513(a) defines an "unrelated
trade or business" as (1) any trade or business, (2) regularly carried on, (3) the
conduct of which is not substantially related to the organization's exempt
purpose.
An exempt organization may obtain revenues from donations or fees such
as admission charges to a museum or college tuition. These revenue sources
are not taxable because the exempt organization derives them as a result of
fulfilling its exempt purpose. In addition, an exempt organization may obtain
revenues from carrying on a trade or business that is related to its exempt
21.
22.

See I.R.C. § 511 (2000) (stating that unrelated business income will be taxed).
See id. § 512(a)(1) (defining unrelated business taxable income).
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23

purpose. For example, an exempt organization may be formed to assist
homeless persons in obtaining skills so that they will become capable of
supporting themselves financially. To accomplish this goal, the organization
may operate a restaurant that is completely staffed by the homeless
individuals who are responsible for food preparation, cashiering, and food
service. The business may earn a profit, but its primary purpose is not to
raise money, but to help homeless individuals become employable.
Therefore, any net profit that the restaurant earns is not subject to the
unrelated business income tax.
An exempt organization may also choose to operate an unrelated trade or
business. If the business is regularly carried on and is not operated for the
primary purpose of furthering the organization's exempt purpose (other than
its need for funds), it is subject to taxation unless an exception applies. In
order for I.R.C. Section 513 to apply, however, the trade or business must be
24
both regularly carried on and unrelated. For example, a group of citizens
may form a civic booster club to place welcome signs and flower boxes at
entrances to their city. To pay for the signs and flower boxes, the civic
booster club might hold a bake sale at a local church twice a year. The bake
sale is a trade or business not related to the booster group's exempt purpose
(beautifying the city), but it is not regularly carried on and therefore not
subject to I.R.C. Section 513. However, if the civic club were to hold a bake
sale every day, it would be regularly operating the trade or business of a
bakery, and the profits would be subject to the unrelated business income tax.
I.R.C. Section 5 12(a) provides that the term unrelated business taxable
income is the gross income derived by an organization from the operation of
an unrelated trade or business, subject to certain modifications or exclusions
contained in I.R.C. Section 512(b).25 The most significant exclusions are
26
dividends, interest, certain real estate rentals, annuities, and royalties.
B. The JudiciallyCreated Destination of Income Test
and Congress'sResponse
In order to understand why mailing list rental and affinity card income
should not be subject to the unrelated business income tax, one needs to
explore Congress's reasons for enacting the tax and the abuses it was
23.
24.
25.
26.

See id. § 513(a)(2) (providing an exception to the tax in Section 511).
See id. § 513(a) (determining when this section applies).
See id. § 512(a)(1) (defining unrelated business taxable income).
See id. § 512(b)(1)-(3) (setting forth the primary modifications and exclusions).
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intended to address and remedy. Nonprofit organizations have not always
been subject to tax on revenues derived from business activities unrelated to
their exempt functions. Since the earliest Europeans established settlements in
North America, supporting charitable endeavors has been a part of our societal
framework, and part of that support has been in the form of exempting
nonprofit organizations from tax. 27 After the American Revolution,
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and New Hampshire provided for the
protection of charities in their respective state constitutions.
Other states
enacted statutes to support and to encourage charities, and charities continued
to enjoy a preferred tax status after passage of the Sixteenth Amendment and
the first constitutional federal income tax.29
The Tariff Act of 191330 exempted from taxation any corporation
"organized and operated exclusively for religious.., purposes, no part of the
net income of which inures to the benefit of any private stockholder or
individual.'1 The Act did not draw any distinction between revenues derived
from activities related to the nonprofit organization's exempt purpose and
unrelated activities. 32 After enactment of the Act, the Supreme Court decided
Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores33 and created the destination of
income test for nonprofits. 34 In Sagrada,the revenue agent for the Philippine
Islands assessed an income tax against a religious order that operated missions
in Southeast Asia on the ground that the order had obtained funds from the
operation of a trade or business. 35 The religious order derived the bulk of its
income from rents, dividends, interest, and gains from the occasional sale of
stock.36 The order also derived a relatively modest amount of income from the
sale of wine, chocolates, and other miscellaneous items to its churches,
missions, and other agencies for their own use.37 The Philippine revenue agent
27.

See ROBERT H. BREMMER, AMERICAN PHILANTHROPY 5-18 (2d ed. 1988) (outlining

the history of tax exemptions for charities in early America).
28.

JAMES J. FIsHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, TAXATION OFNONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS

29-

30 (2003) (observing that these four states protected charities in their constitutions).
29. Id. at 30 (noting that some states affirmed the benefits of charities through statutes).
30. Act of Oct. 3, 1913, Pub. L. No. 38-16, 38 Stat. 114 (repealed 1916).
31. Id. at 172.
32. See id. (drawing no distinction between the organization's purpose and activities).
33. Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores, 263 U.S. 578 (1924).
34. Id. at 581.
35. See id. (stating that the defendant argued that the plaintiff was operated for "business
and commercial purposes" and this was not within the exception).
36. See id. at 580 n. 1 (showing that the order received 240,948.23 pesos from these
sources).
37. See id. (showing that the order received 13,654.16 pesos from these sales).
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argued that the religious order was not organized and operated exclusively for
charitable purposes because it was engaging in the business of selling wine and
chocolate.3 8 In other words, although the order used the funds for religious
purposes, the revenue agent assessed a tax because the order had obtained the
funds from commercial activities and not from the operation of its exempt
purpose.
The United States Supreme Court held that the income was incidental in
amount but, more importantly, that the statute did not make any reference to the
source of the funds used by the charitable organization; it focused exclusively
on the destination of the funds. 39 If the funds, however derived, were used
exclusively for charitable purposes, the funds were not subject to tax. In the
instant case, there was no indication that the religious order's income was used
for any purpose other than charity. 4°
The destination of income test received further reinforcement from the
decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Roche's Beach, Inc.
v. Commissioner,4 1 decided under the tax code in effect in 1928.42 Edward
Roche made provision in his will for the formation of a corporation to operate a
beach-bathing business that was obligated to turn over the net proceeds to a
charitable organization Roche established to assist indigent persons.4 3 The
beach-bathing business rented bathhouses, towels, and suits, and sold
concessions to the public.44 The Second Circuit relied on Sagradain support
of its position that "the destination of the income is more significant than its
source." 45 The Second Circuit held that the destination of income test applied
even when the income was not earned by the nonprofit organization itself but
also where the source of the funds was a related taxable entity, such as a
subsidiary that, in turn, funneled the funds to the nonprofit organization. 46 The
38. See id. at 581 (summarizing the agent's arguments).
39. See id. (explaining that the "destination [of the income is] the ultimate test of
exemption").
40. See id. (concluding the income from the properties was devoted exclusively to the
religious, charitable, and educational functions and that the trading is not a "distinct or external
venture").
41. Roche's Beach, Inc. v. Comm'r, 96 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1938).
42. I.R.C. § 103(6), (14) (1928).
43. See Roche's Beach, 96 F.2d at 776-77 (outlining the formation, assets, and purpose of
this corporation).
44. See id. at 777 (explaining how the corporation generated income).
45. Id. at 778.
46. See id. at 779 (stating that Congress intended for the exemption to apply both to
corporations that "administer the charity" and to corporations "organized and operated
exclusively to feed a charitable purpose").
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court held that as long as the nonprofit organization used the funds for a taxexempt purpose, the income was not subject to tax.47
The destination of income test began to generate controversy when an
increasing number of exempt organizations began operating wholly owned
commercial businesses. 48 As mentioned earlier, the most contentious was New
York University's ownership of the C.F. Mueller Co., a New Jersey corporation
and the largest manufacturer of macaroni products in the 1940s. 49 New York
University's benefactors formed a Delaware corporation that purchased all of
the stock of the New Jersey C.F. Mueller Co. and merged it into the Delaware
corporation. 50 The stock of the new Delaware corporation would be donated to
New York University after ten years. 5' The Internal Revenue Service assessed
a tax on C.F. Mueller Co.'s income, and C.F. Mueller Co. objected and filed
suit in the Tax Court.5 2
The Tax Court ruled against C.F. Mueller Co., stating that the destination
of income test should not be "stretched and distorted" to cover situations that
were not originally contemplated by the United States Supreme Court when
Sagradawas decided, nor by other courts in later cases because "[s]uch use of
business corporations is relatively new, born principally of the necessity for
colleges to obtain more income than the return theretofore received on their
funds available for investment., 53 The Tax Court also refused to follow the
reasoning of Roche's Beach. 4
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit overruled the decision of the
Tax Court 55 on the ground that prior case law, including Roche's Beach,
established that if the destination of the income was for charitable purposes,
the income was not subject to tax.56 The appellate court noted that Congress

47.

See id. (saying that income used for tax-exempt purposes is covered by the

exemption).
48. See Sharpe, supra note 4, at 381-83 (discussing cases and examples involving the
destination of income standard).
49. Note, supra note 3, at 1281.
50. C.F. Mueller Co. v. Comm'r, 14 T.C. 922, 923-24 (1950), rev'd, 190 F.2d 120 (3d
Cir. 1951).

51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 925.
Id. at 923.
Id. at 927.
Id. at 928.

55. C.F. Mueller Co. v. Comm'r, 190 F.2d 120, 123 (3d Cir. 1951).
56. See id. at 121 (summarizing what is needed to meet the statutory requirements by
referencing prior cases).
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reenacted the pertinent tax code sections several times without change prior to
the C.F. Mueller Co. litigation, lending further support to the application of the
destination of income standard. 57
C. CongressionalResponse to the Destinationof Income Test
By 1950 the public outcry over nonprofit organizations' commercial
activities galvanized Congress to take action.5 8 While the Revenue Act of
59
1950, which contained the proposed unrelated business income tax provisions,
was pending, Congress held hearings and heard testimony from both the
6
0
business community and representatives from colleges and universities.
Congress's main goal in enacting the unrelated business income tax was to
prevent unfair competition. 6' However, raising revenue was another important
consideration: Congress wished to repeal various excise taxes that had been
imposed to fund World War H, but the escalating conflict in Korea created a
need for more revenue.62 In addition, Congress was concerned about nonprofits
diverting their resources from their exempt purposes towards commercial
activity.63 Both the House Ways and Means Committee Report and the Senate
Finance Committee Report noted these considerations underlying the proposed
enactment of the unrelated business income tax: "Military action in Korea
coupled with substantial increases in defense and related expenditures has made
it necessary to convert the excise tax reduction bill passed by the House in June
of this year into a bill to raise revenues."64
The House bill imposed the regular corporate income tax on certain taxexempt organizations that are in the nature of corporations, and the individual
income tax on tax-exempt trusts, with respect to so much of their income as
enterprises that are unrelated to the exempt purposes
arises from active business
65
of the organizations.
57. Id. at 122-23.
58. See Note, supra note 3, at 1281 (stating that the C.F. Mueller Co. gave Congress "a
reason to tax charity-owned businesses").
59. See generally Revenue Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-814, §§ 301, 331, 64 Stat. 906,
947, 957 (codified as amended at I.R.C. §§ 502-514 (1954)).
60. See generally HearingsBefore House Comm., supra note 8.
61. H.R. REP. No. 81-2319, at 36 (1950).
62. See S. REP. No. 81-2375, at 1 (1950) (asserting that military and defense expenses
required the conversion of the excise tax reduction bill to become a revenue increasing bill).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 27.
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The problem to which the tax on unrelated business income is directed
here is primarily that of unfair competition. The tax-free status of these Section
101 organizations enables them to use their profits tax-free to expand
operations, while their competitors can expand only with the profits remaining
after taxes.66
President Truman also shared Congress's concerns and sent a written
message to Congress outlining his tax policy views and concerns.67 President
Truman specifically raised the issue of nonprofits' commercial activities and
expressed his concern that such activity reduced federal revenues, improperly
diverted nonprofits' resources, and created unfair competition:
Some tax loopholes have also been developed through the abuse of the tax
exemption accorded educational and charitable organizations. It has
properly been the policy of the Federal Government since the beginning of
the income tax to encourage the development of these organizations. That
policy should not be changed. But the few glaring abuses of the taxexemption privilege should be stopped.
Responsible educational leaders share in the concern about the fact that an
exemption intended to protect educational activities has been misused in a
few instances to gain competitive advantage over private enterprise through
the conduct of business and industrial operations entirely unrelated to
educational activities.
There are also instances where the exemption accorded charitable trust
funds has been used as a cloak for speculative business ventures, and the
funds intended for charitable purposes, buttressed by tax exemption, have
been used to
acquire or retain control over a wide variety of industrial
6
enterprises.

8

Although the colleges and universities acquiesced in taxing nonprofits'
unrelated business income, they were adamant that certain commercially
derived revenues, such as dividends and interest, remain exempt, and Congress
agreed. The House Ways and Means Committee report discussed the
exceptions to the unrelated business income tax contained in I.R.C. Section
512(b):
The tax applied to unrelated business income does not apply to dividends,
interest, royalties, (including, of course, overriding royalties), rents (other
than certain rents on property acquired with borrowed funds), and gains
from sales of leased property. Your committee believes that such "passive"
66. H.R. REP. No. 81-2319, at 36 (1950).
67. See generally President's Message to Congress, 96 CONG. REc. 769 (1950).
68.

Id. at 771.
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income should not be taxed where it is used for exempt purposes because
investments producing incomes of these types have long
69 been recognized as
proper for educational and charitable organizations.
The unrelated business income tax provisions did not define trade or
business or royalty, 70 paving the way for disputes. Although Congress was
concerned about unfair competition, it enacted a statute that dealt with
Congress apparently conflated unfair
unrelated trade or businesses.
competition and unrelated businesses, but the two concepts are not
conterminous. For example, related businesses can compete with and possibly
harm commercial entities.7 '
D. What Is a Trade or Business?
Taxpayers may derive income not only from the operation of a trade or
business, but from other sources, such as investments, gifts, or hobbies. The
source of income matters because some income is not included in gross income
at all; other income may not be offset by deductions. 72 According to the
Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Groetzinger,7 3 "not every incomeproducing and profit-making endeavor constitutes a trade or business." 74 For a
commercial enterprise, the distinction usually does not matter-virtually all
activity is deemed to be a trade or business; 75 however, the distinction does
76
matter for individual taxpayers and nonprofits. In Higgins v. Commissioner,
an individual taxpayer had extensive investments to which he devoted a
"considerable portion of his time" overseeing and for which he incurred
69. H.R. REP. No. 81-2319, at 38 (1950). For a more detailed chronology of the unrelated
business income tax's enactment, see Judge Tannenwald's opinion in University Hill
Foundation v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 548, 561-66 (1969).
70. See generallyRevenue Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-814, §§ 301, 331, 64 Stat. 906,
947, 957 (codified as amended at I.R.C. §§ 502-514 (1954)).
71. See generally Susan Rose-Ackerman, Unfair Competition and CorporateIncome
Taxation, 34 STAN. L. REv. 1017 (1982).
72. For example, I.R.C. § 102 excludes gifts from gross income, and I.R.C. § 83 permits a
taxpayer to deduct expenses incurred in the pursuit of a hobby only up to the amount of income
earned from the hobby. I.R.C. §§ 83, 102 (2000).
73. Comm'r v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23 (1987).
74. Id. at 35.
75. See BORIs I. BrrKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 5.03[1] (6th ed. 1999) (stating that the Code assumes that
all transactions for the benefit of the corporation's interests arise in the corporation's trade or
business).
76. Higgins v. Comm'r, 312 U.S. 212 (1941).
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substantial expenses, such as office rental space and salaries for employees he
hired to assist him." The Supreme Court indicated that an individual taxpayer
cannot deduct expenses incurred while managing personal investments, but
rather only those expenses incurred from a trade or business.78 Immediately
afterward, Congress enacted I.R.C. Section 212 to permit individual taxpayers
to deduct their investment expenses. 79
Nevertheless, for individual taxpayers the distinction between a trade or
business, as opposed to investment activity, still matters because trade or
business expenses may be deducted directly from the gross income derived
from the trade or business. 80 That same taxpayer only may deduct investment
expenses if the taxpayer itemizes deductions in lieu of the standard deduction
and only if a certain monetary threshold is met.81 Therefore, individual
taxpayers, as opposed to commercial enterprises, must determine whether
income-generating activity is a trade or business on the one hand or investment
on the other.
Most nonprofits are operated in corporate form; 82 however, unlike a
commercial corporation where revenue presumably arises from the operation of
a trade or business,83 nonprofit corporations presumably generate their income
from noncommercial activity, such as donations, fee service income, or
government grants. In other words, the presumed norm is that the nonprofit
corporation does not engage in activities for profit, but rather to fulfill its
exempt purpose. Some nonprofits, however, operate trades or businesses that
are unrelated to their exempt purpose. I.R.C. Section 512(b) then exempts
revenues derived from dividends, interest, royalties, and certain rents from the
unrelated business taxable income.84 Therefore, just as with individual
77. Id. at 213.
78. See id. at 217-18 (upholding the decision by the Board of Tax Appeals that the
activities of the petitioner did not qualify as "carrying on a business").
79. Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, § 121, 56 Stat. 798, 819.
80. I.R.C. §§ 62(a)(1) and 162(a) permit taxpayers to deduct "above the line" expenses
incurred from operating a trade or business. In other words, the taxpayer will get the benefit of
the deduction because the taxpayer may deduct the expenses directly against the gross income to
calculate adjusted gross income. I.R.C. §§ 62(a)(1), 162(a) (2000).
81. I.R.C. § 212 permits a taxpayer to deduct as an itemized deduction investment
expenses. I.R.C. § 63(d) allows the taxpayer to deduct itemized deductions in lieu of the
standard deduction; therefore, the taxpayer will only itemize deductions if the total amount
exceeds the standard deduction. I.R.C. §§ 67 and 68 impose additional limits on the amount
that the taxpayer may deduct. Id. §§ 63(d), 67, 68, 212.
82. See Henry Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 840
(1980) (discussing the structure of nonprofit organizations).
83. BrrrKER & EUSTICE, supra note 75, 5.03[ 1].
84. I.R.C. § 512(b) (2000).
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taxpayers, nonprofit corporations must distinguish between trade or business
income and other income, such as income derived from the sources listed in
I.R.C. Section 512(b).85 Additionally complicating matters for nonprofits, they
must distinguish between unrelated and related businesses.86
During the past sixty years, neither Congress nor the courts have been able
to fashion a general, all-inclusive definition of a trade or business.8 7 However,
the Supreme Court in Groetzingernoted that at times the Code will define the
term for a limited purpose. 88 In an oft-cited concurring opinion in Deputy v. du
Pont,89 Justice Frankfurter posited that a trade or business involved "holding
one's self out to others as engaged in the selling of goods or services. ''90
However, one year later the Supreme Court decided Higgins v.
Commissioner.91 Ignoring Justice Frankfurter's definition, the Court rather
tersely stated that "[t]o determine whether the activities of a taxpayer are
'carrying on a business' requires an examination of the facts in each case. 9 2
Subsequent to Higgins, the lower courts struggled to determine whether a
particular activity was a trade or business.93 Various formulations were tried
and discarded over the years, but no one definition or test has sufficed for all
purposes.
85. Id.
86. See id. §§ 511-513 (imposing a tax on income derived from activities unrelated to the
charitable purposes of the organization).
87. See Comm'r v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 27 (1987) (concerning the lack of definition
for trade or business). The majority stated:
The phrase "trade or business" has been in section 162(a) and in that section's
predecessors for many years. Indeed, the phrase is common in the Code, for it
appears in over 50 sections and 800 subsections and in hundreds of places in
proposed and final income tax regulations.... The concept thus has a well-known
and almost constant presence on our tax-law terrain. Despite this, the Code has
never contained a definition of the words "trade or business" for general
application, and no regulation has been issued expounding its meaning for all
purposes. Neither has a broadly applicable authoritative judicial definition
emerged.
Id.
88. Id. at 27 n.6.
89. Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940).
90. Id. at 499 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
91. Higgins v. Comm'r, 312 U.S. 212 (1941).
92. Id. at 217.
93. See, e.g., Disabled Am. Veterans v. United States, 650 F.2d 1178, 1187 (Ct. Cl. 1981)
(stating that if an activity is conducted in a competitive, commercial manner, it is a trade or
business); Stanton v. Comm'r, 399 F.2d 326, 329 (5th Cir. 1968) (opining that trade or business
refers to "extensive activity over a substantial period of time during which the taxpayer holds
himself out as selling goods or services").
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In Groetzinger,94 the Supreme Court adhered to its position in Higginsthat
the determination of whether an activity rises to the level of a trade or business
is one of fact and explicitly rejected the notion of one all-encompassing test. 95
With regard to Justice Frankfurter's formulation in Higgins, the Court stated
that "[wle must regard the Frankfurter gloss merely as a two-Justice
pronouncement in a passing moment and, while entitled to respect, as never
having achieved the status of a Court ruling.... We therefore now formally
96
reject the Frankfurter gloss which the Court has never adopted anyway."
E. Statutory and Regulation Definitions of UnrelatedTrade or Business
I.R.C. Section 513(a) provides that an unrelated trade or business is one
that is not related to the nonprofit organization's exempt purpose, but it does
not define a trade or business for unrelated business income tax purposes. 97 In
1967 the Treasury Department promulgated the current regulations,98 which
attempt to define trade or business activity for purposes of the unrelated
business income tax. Treasury Regulation Section 1.513-1(b) provides in
pertinent part as follows:
(b) Trade or business. The primary objective of adoption of the unrelated
business income tax was to eliminate a source of unfair competition by
placing the unrelated business activities of certain exempt organizations
upon the same tax basis as the nonexempt business endeavors with which
they compete. On the other hand, where an activity does not possess the
characteristics of a trade or business within the meaning of section 162,
such as when an organization sends out low-cost articles incidental to the
solicitation of charitable contributions, the unrelated business income tax
does not apply since the organization is not in competition with taxable
organizations. However, in general, any activity of a section 511
organization which is carried on for the production of income and which
otherwise possesses the characteristics required to constitute trade or
business within the meaning of section 162-and which, in addition, is not
substantially related to the performance of exempt functions-presents
94.

Comm'r v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23 (1987).
95. Id. at 36.
96. Id. at 32, 34.
97. I.R.C. § 513(a) (2000); see Sharpe, supra note 4, 414-18 (detailing the differing
standards employed by the 1958 regulations and the 1967 regulations to distinguish between
related and unrelated trades or businesses).
98. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b) (1983); see generallyNote, supra note 3 (discussing in detail
the reasons that led to the enactment of the new regulations and the problems they were
designed to remedy).
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sufficient likelihood of unfair competition to be within the policy of the tax.
Accordingly, for purposes of section 513 the term trade orbusiness has the
same meaning it has in section 162, and generally includes any activity
carried on for the production
of income from the sale of goods or the
99
performance of services.
Treasury Regulation Section 1.513-1(b) defines a trade or business as
having the "same meaning it has in I.R.C. Section 162, and generally includes
any activity carried on for the production of income from the sale of goods or
the performance of services. "l°° Parsing this definition does not reveal a
coherent, readily ascertainable standard to assist the courts and nonprofit
organizations as to which activities will be deemed a trade or business.
I.R.C. Section 162 provides little guidance because its primary purpose is
to authorize deductions for a trade or business.' 0 ' Section 162 allows
deductions for a business that is being carried on, indicating that the business
must be in the operating stage and not merely in the planning or start-up
stages. 10 2 However, the section contributes little else to the definition.
Treasury Regulation Section 1.513-1(b) further defines a trade or business
as including any activity carried on for the production of income from the sale
of goods or the performance of services. The "production of income"
component does not provide a means for distinguishing between types of
income-generating activity, such as trades or businesses, investments, or
hobbies, all of which can be carried on for the production of income. Further,
I.R.C. Section 212(1), which generally authorizes an individual taxpayer to3
deduct investment expenses, also uses the term production of income.10
However, the Court has determined that a taxpayer's personal investment
activity, no matter how substantial and continuous, is not deemed to be the
operation of a trade or business.1°4

99. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b) (1983).
100. Id. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b) was adopted in essentially its current form in 1967.
"Proposed regulations were announced in Technical Information Release 899 (Apr. 14, 1967).
Final regulations were set out on Dec. 11, 1967, effective for taxable years beginning after Dec.
12, 1967. T.D. 6939, 1968-1 C.B. 274." Sharpe, supra note 4, at 415 n.139.
101. See I.R.C. § 162(a) (2000) (providing that "[t]here shall be allowed as a deduction all
the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any
trade or business").
102. Id.; cf. id. § 174 (permitting deductions for research and development expenses).
103. Id. § 212(1) (allowing deductions for expenses paid or incurred for the production or
collection of income).
104. See Comm'r v. Higgins, 312 U.S 212, 218 (1941) (finding the taxpayer's personal
investment and record-keeping activities insufficient to establish trade or business activity).
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Treasury Regulation Section 1.513-1(b) contains the Frankfurter glossincome from the sale of goods or the performance of services. 10 5 Treasury
Regulation Section 1.513-1(b) was adopted in essentially its current form in
1967.106 Its definition of trade or business, therefore, predates Groetzinger,
which rejected the Frankfurter gloss. 10 7 It is not clear whether the Treasury
Department promulgated the definition of a trade or business in the regulation
with a specific intent to adopt the Frankfurter gloss as being definitive for
purposes of the unrelated business income tax, or whether the Frankfurter gloss
was incorporated merely because it was a standard frequently relied on at that
time by the courts.
Regulation 1.513-1(b) also provides that a nonprofit organization's
activity may be broken down or fragmented into component parts, and the
unrelated business income tax be applied to just a component part.10 8 Activities
of producing goods or performing services do not lose their identity as a trade
or business merely because they are carried on within a larger aggregate of
similar activities or within a larger complex of other endeavors that may or may
not be related to the organization's exempt purpose. 1°9 In other words, the
regulation permits the Internal Revenue Service to fragment an integrated
business activity, which might be related to the nonprofit organization's exempt
purpose, into component parts in order to treat a component part as an unrelated
trade or business." 0 For example, a journal published by an exempt
organization might further its exempt purpose, but the advertising contained in
the journal may become subject to the unrelated business income tax.111
In 1969 Congress enacted I.R.C. Section 513(c)," 12 which adopted the
regulation's concept of fragmenting a business into its component parts as
provided in Regulation 1.513-1(b). Section 513(c) provides as follows:

105. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b) (1983).
106. See supra note 100 (outlining the promulgation of this regulation).
107. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text (discussing the rejection of the
Frankfurter gloss).
108. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b); see also Sharpe, supra note 4, at 418 (discussing the
Treasury Department's determination to tax advertising income by promulgating this
regulation).
109. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b).
110. See United States v. Am. Coll. of Physicians, 475 U.S. 834, 839-41 (1986)
(discussing the concept of fragmenting a business into its component parts).
111. See Sharpe, supra note 4, at 418 (discussing goals of the 1967 regulations).
112. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 502(c), 83 Stat. 487,576 (codified as
I.R.C. § 513(c) (2000)).
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(c) Advertising, etc., activities.-For purposes of this section, the term
"trade or business" includes any activity which is carried on for the
production of income from the sale of goods or the performance of
services. For purposes of the preceding sentence, an activity does not lose
identity as a trade or business merely because it is carried on within a larger
aggregate of similar activities or within a larger complex of other endeavors
which may, or may not, be related to the exempt purposes of the
organization."13
At first glance, I.R.C. Section 513(c) appears to provide that, for purposes
of the unrelated business income tax, trade or business means the sale of goods
or the performance of services; however, it is unclear whether I.R.C. Section
513(c) furnishes an all-inclusive definition of trade or business. Donald Sharpe
argues that I.R.C. Section 513(c)'s function is to ensure that a component part
of a trade or business as well as a whole business will be included within the
unrelated business income tax and, therefore, is not intended to be an allinclusive definition for purposes of the unrelated business income tax." 4 His5
position is supported by the House Ways and Means Committee report"
accompanying H.R. 13270; the report stated in pertinent part as follows:
On December 12, 1967, the Treasury Department promulgated regulations
under section 513 of the code concerning the application of the unrelated
business tax when the business was a part of a complex of activities which
were in the overall carried on in the exercise of the exempt function. These
regulations specified that the carrying on of a business in competition with
taxpaying business would be subject to tax although the business was only a
part of a much larger endeavor related to the exempt function. Thus, unless
the business contributed importantly to the exempt purpose or function, the
income derived from its operation would be subject to tax.

Because of the ensuing controversy over this problem your committee has
decided to deal with this subject by legislation. In general, it is in
agreement with the purpose of the regulations. Your committee believes
that a business competing with taxpaying organizations should not be
granted an unfair competitive advantage by operating tax free unless the
business contributes importantly to the exempt function. It has concluded
113.
114.

Id. § 513(c).
See Sharpe, supra note 4, at 420 (interpreting the meaning of "includes" in I.R.C.

§ 513(c), and stating that "the language is presumably not intended as an all-encompassing
definition for purposes of a tax on unrelated trade or business"); see also Am. Coll of
Physicians, 475 U.S. at 839-40 (observing that by enacting § 513(c), Congress specifically
endorsed the Treasury's concept of segregating the trade or business of advertising from the
trade or business of publishing an exempt journal).
115.

H.R. REP. No. 91-413 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1645.
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that by this standard, advertising in a journal published by an exempt
functions,
organization is not related to the exempt organization's exempt
6
and therefore it believes that this income should be taxed."

In addition, when the 1967 regulations were promulgated, the Internal Revenue
of the new regulations would be
Service announced that one of the main effects
17
to subject advertising income to the tax.'
F. JudicialAttempts To Define UnrelatedTrade or Business
The legislative history clearly reflects Congress's concern about unfair
competition, diversion of resources, and raising revenue; 18 however, I.R.C.
Section 513 does not rely on any of those criteria for determining whether
income should be taxed. Instead, the statute looks to whether the nonprofit's
activity is related or unrelated to its exempt purpose." 9
The federal courts struggled to find appropriate criteria when applying the
Higgins fact test to trade or business determinations in the unrelated business
area. Some of the factors that the courts used were whether the nonprofit had a
profit motive, whether the business was operated in a competitive commercial
manner, or whether there was a risk of unfair competition. 20 The courts
116.
117.

Id. at 1695.
See Note, supra note 3, at n.38 (stating that the Internal Revenue Service announced

that the new regulations would tax advertising income of exempt organizations and relax
restrictions on trade shows) (citing Internal Revenue Service Technical Information Release No.
899 (Apr. 14, 1967), 7 CCH 1967 STAND. FED. TAx REP.16557, at 71,594; Announcement 6718, 1967 INT. REv. BuLL. No. 19, at 43).
118. See H.R. REP. No. 81-2319, at 36 (1950) ("The problem at which the tax on unrelated
business is directed here is primarily that of unfair competition."); S. REP. No. 81-2375, at 28
(1950) (stating that the tax on unrelated business income was meant to address the problem of
unfair competition); President's Message to Congress, 96 CONG. REc. 769, 771 (1950) (asking
that Congress address the problem of unfair competition between tax-exempt and taxed entities).
119. I.R.C. § 513(a) provides as follows:
(a) General rule. The term "unrelated trade or business" means, in the case of any
organization subject to the tax imposed by section 511, any trade or business the
conduct .of which is not substantially related (aside from the need of such
organization for income... ) to the exercise or performance by such organization
of its charitable, educational, or other purpose or function constituting the basis for
its exemption ....
I.R.C. § 513(a) (2000).
120. See, e.g., La. Credit Union League v. United States, 693 F.2d 525 (5th Cir. 1982)
(looking to the existence of a profit motive for an activity to constitute a trade or business);
Stanton v. Comm'r, 399 F.2d 326, 329 (5th Cir. 1968) (opining that business activity is a trade
or business if it is extensive activity over a substantial period of time during which the taxpayer
held himself out as selling goods or services); Disabled Am. Veterans v. United States, 650 F.2d
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attempted to extract from Treasury Regulation Section 1.513-1 (b) appropriate
factors to apply, although the regulation's several references to competition
created uncertainty anong the courts as to what weight, if any, should be
accorded to the risk of unfair competition.
In Clarence LaBelle Post No. 217 v. United States,121 the Eighth Circuit
held that the existence of unfair competition was not a necessary condition for
imposing the unrelated business income tax; the desire for revenue also
motivated Congress.122 The plaintiff, a fraternal and patriotic veterans
organization in Minnesota exempt under I.R.C. Section 501(c)(4), sued for
refund after the Internal Revenue Service imposed the unrelated business
income tax on income the taxpayer received from bingo games. 123 Minnesota
only permitted nonprofit organizations to operate bingo games; therefore, the
plaintiff did not compete against any commercial enterprise. 124 The plaintiff
prevailed in the district court on its argument that an unrelated trade or business
could be taxed only if the trade or business competed with a taxpaying entity
because the purpose of the tax was to prevent unfair competition. 125 On appeal,
the government successfully argued that the tax applied to any unrelated trade
26
or business. 1
The appellate court noted the legislative history indicated that although
Congress was concerned with eliminating unfair competition, "that goal existed
only as part of a larger goal of raising revenue.', 27 Further, the court noted that
the recently enacted I.R.C. Section 513(d) furnished evidence "that sections
511-513 should be interpreted broadly to apply to all businesses falling within
the literal meaning of the term 'any trade or business.,' 28 The court also noted
that LR.C. Section 513(d) excluded horse racing at county fairs and the rental
29
of display space at trade shows from the term "unrelated trade or business." 1
The court reasoned that Congress simply could have amended I.R.C. Section
513 to create a general exclusion for any trade or business that did not face
competition but instead chose to carve out only two narrow exceptions, thus
1178, 1187 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (holding that an activity conducted in a competitive, commercial
manner is a trade or business).
121. Clarence LaBelle Post No. 217 v. United States, 580 F.2d 270 (8th Cir. 1978).

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 272. '
Id. at 271.'
Id.
Id.
Id. at 272.
Id.
Id. at 273.
Id.
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not a sufficient factor to exclude an
indicating that lack of competition was 130
unrelated trade or business from the tax.
The appellate court also turned for support to Treasury Regulation Section
1.513-1(b). The court interpreted the regulation to focus primarily on the
commercial nature of the activity to be taxed, and stated that "references to
competition serve merely to explain reasons why an activity that lacks a
commercial orientation should not be considered a trade or business. "131
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit in Hope School v. UnitedStates'3 2 found
that the existence of unfair competition was the primary consideration for
determining if an exempt organization was engaged in an unrelated trade or
business, expressly disagreeing with the Eighth Circuit:
To the extent the [LaBelle] court held that unfair competition is not the only
factor to be considered, we support its holding .... However, to the extent
that LaBelle may hold that
33 unfair competition is not the primary
consideration, we disagree.'
The Seventh Circuit also rejected profit motive as an appropriate test for
determining if an exempt organization's activities rise to the level of a trade or
business:
The Internal Revenue Code nowhere gives a precise definition of "trade or
business," but some guidelines can be gleaned from the Treasury
Regulations and case law. In regulation § 1.513-1(b), the Service states
that the same standard applies for determining whether an activity
constitutes a trade or business for purposes of section 513 as for purposes
of section 162 .... In McDowell v. Ribicoff, 292 F.2d 174, 178 (3rd
Cir.) ... a case discussing the requirements for a trade or business under
section 162, the court elaborated further:
The phrase 'trade or business' connotes something more than an act or
course of activity engaged in for profit. Indeed, the Internal Revenue Code
itself ... distinguishes between a 'trade or business'
34 on the one hand and a
'transaction entered into for profit' on the other.1

130. See id. (noting that Congress "chose to carve out only two specific exceptions rather
than create a general exception for noncompetitive businesses operated by tax-exempt
organizations").
131. Id. at 274 (internal quotations omitted).
132. Hope School v. United States, 612 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1980).
133. Id. at 304.
134. Id. at 301.
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Several years later, the Fifth Circuit issued its opinion in LouisianaCredit
Union League v. United States,'35 endorsing a profit-motive standard for
determining the existence of a trade or business:
We believe that the "profit motive" standard is the proper one to be applied
in this case, for it is consistent with the plain language of section 513 as
well as the accompanying regulations. The statute, which clearly
encompasses within its parameters any activity "carried on for the
production of income," first raises the issue of motive. The regulations,
which invoke section 162 and its "profit motive" gloss, confirm that motive
is the key inquiry. Thus, to determine whether a tax-exempt organization is
carrying on a trade or business, the court must look to see whether that
institution is engaged in extensive
36 activity over a substantial period of time
profit.
a
earn
to
intent
the
with
In each one of these cases, the courts were interpreting the same code sections
and regulations to devise an appropriate standard for determining the existence
of an unrelated trade or business, yet the courts could not even agree about
which factors should be relevant (unfair competition, revenue raising, or profit
motive).
In 1986, several months before its decision in Groetzinger,the Supreme Court
stepped into the fray and issued its opinion in United States v. American Bar
Endowment.137 The American Bar Endowment (ABE) was an I.R.C. Section
501(c)(3) organization that distributed grants to charitable and education groups in
order to fulfill its primary purpose of advancing legal research and promoting the
administration ofjustice. 138 ABE obtained the funds for the grants by providing group
insurance underwritten by major insurance companies to its members. 39 ABE
negotiated the premiums with the insurers, compiled lists of its members, solicited
and collected the insurance premiums from them, transmitted the premiums to the
insurers, maintained files on the policyholders, and answered members'
questions. 14° The insurers' cost of providing the insurance was less than the
premium ABE paid, and every year the insurers would refund the excess to ABE
as a dividend.' 4 1 As a condition of participating in the insurance program, ABE
135. See La. Credit Union League v. United States, 693 F.2d 525, 543 (5th Cir. 1982)
(finding that the Internal Revenue Service correctly assessed a tax on a nonprofit entity for
unrelated business income).
136. Id. at 532.
137. United States v. Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105 (1986).
138. Id. at 107.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 108.
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members had to agree to allow ABE to keep the dividend rather than distribute
it pro rata to the participating members.142 Therefore, ABE could have
negotiated a lower premium for its members, but instead priced the policies
43
competitively with other insurance policies available to the public.
The Claims Court found that ABE was not engaged in a trade or
business,144 and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed. ' 4 ' The
Supreme Court reversed, stating that "ABE's activity is both 'the sale of goods'
and 'the performance of services,' and possesses the general characteristics of a
trade or business. '146 Although American Bar Endowment was supposed to
provide some clarity as to what constitutes a trade or business in the nonprofit
area, it did not do so. The Supreme Court relied in part on the Frankfurter
gloss contained in Treasury Regulation Section 1.513-1(b). Just months after
its decision in American Bar Endowment, the Supreme Court decided
Groetzinger147 and rejected the Frankfurter gloss, stating:
We are not satisfied that the Frankfurter gloss would add any helpful
dimension to the resolution of cases such as this one, or that it provides a
"sensible test," as the Commissioner urges .... It might assist now and then,
when the answer is obvious and positive, but it surely is capable of
breeding litigation over the meaning of "goods," the meaning of "services,"
or the meaning of "holding one's self out." And we suspect that-apart
from gambling-almost every activity would satisfy the gloss. A test that
everyone passes is not a test at all. We therefore now formally reject the
Frankfurter gloss which the Court has never adopted anyway.148
Therefore, it is unclear how much vitality the sale of goods or performance of
services language in the regulation remains.
The Supreme Court in American Bar Endowment also relied on I.R.C.
Section 513(c)'s definition of a trade or business as "any activity which is
carried on for the production of income from the sa!e of goods or the
performance of services."' 49 However, it is unclear whether I.R.C. Section
142.
143.

144.

Id.
Id.
See Am. Bar Endowment v. United States, 4 CI. Ct. 404,411-12 (1984) (holding that

ABE's activities did not meet the statutory requirements of a trade or business and were thus
untaxable).
145. See Am. Bar Endowment v. United States, 761 F.2d 1573, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(upholding the Claims Court's finding that the Internal Revenue Service could not assess a tax
on ABE).
146. United States v. Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 110-11 (1986).
147. Comm'r v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23 (1986).
148. Id. at 34.
149. Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. at 110.
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513's definition is intended to be an all-inclusive definition of a trade or
business for purposes of the unrelated business income tax, or whether it is
to situations where a trade or business is broken down into component
confined
1 50
parts.
Even if the Supreme Court intended sale of goods and performances to be
the definitive standard, the Court muddied the waters by giving seeming
credence to the Claims Court's position that an activity is a trade or business if
it is operated in a "competitive, commercial manner.' 5' The Claims Court had
then concluded that, in fact, ABE did not operate its insurance activity as a
trade or business.'5 2 The Supreme Court rejected the Claims Court's position,
but on the merits, that is, the Supreme Court rejected the Claims Court's
conclusions but not its application of the standard.5 3
The Claims Court also found that ABE's activities were not a trade or
54
business because they did not present the potential for unfair competition.'
Again, the Supreme Court did not reject the.Claims Court's application of the
standard but rather the conclusions that the Claims Court drew from applying
the standard.155 As a result, it remains unclear which standard should be
applied in determining whether a nonprofit organization is engaging in a trade
or business, or whether, in fact, all of these standards may be applied. Against
this backdrop, the courts then were forced to turn their attention to determining
when an activity is a royalty exempt from the unrelated business income tax
under I.R.C. Section 512(b).
III. Interpretationof the Royalty Exception
A. Mailing List Rentals
The first cases that raised challenges to the extent of the royalty exception
to the unrelated business income tax involved mailing lists rentals. Disabled
150. See supra note 114 and accompanying text (discussing Professor Sharpe's position as
to the intended meaning of § 513(c)).
151. See Am. BarEndowment, 477 U.S. at I I I (citing the Claims Court opinion).
152. See Am. Bar Endowment v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 404, 409 (1984) (deciding that
ABE did not operate a trade or business for the purposes of the tax assessment).
153. See Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. at 111-14 (concluding that the Claims Court
misconstrued the facts of the case and thus reached the incorrect outcome on the merits).
154. See Am. BarEndowment, 4 Cl. Ct. at 413-14 (focusing on the competitive aspects of
the activities).
155. See Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. at 114-15 (concluding that the court misapplied
the law to the facts).
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American Veterans (DAV) brought suit for refund of more than $4 million in
taxes paid from 1970 through 1973 on income from the rental of its mailing
list. 56 DAV was an I.R.C. Section 501(c)(4) organization that World War I
veterans formed in 1920 for the primary purpose of providing disabled veterans
with assistance at benefit hearings before the Veterans Administration
boards.157 DAV obtained the funds for its operation primarily by soliciting
donations, and to that end, it maintained a mailing list that at times contained
more than 11 million names, along with such information as the original source
of the name and the amount of the contribution. 15 DAV "expended
considerable time, effort and expense" to maintain the list and deleted obsolete
names and added new ones every six months. 5 9 In order to obtain additional
revenues and to help defray some of the expense of maintaining the list, DAV
began renting its list to both tax-exempt and commercial organizations,
following the usual trade practices of the direct mail industry. 160
As is standard in the mailing list rental industry, DAV prepared "rate
cards" that specify the rate for rentals (for example, $45 per 1000), additional
charges for services such as sorting the list by zip code or size of donation, and
the charges for the type of medium used to transmit the list (for example,
gummed or preprinted labels, or magnetic tape).16' The Tax Court in Disabled
American Veterans v. Commissioner'62 (DA V I) made additional findings as to
how DAV conducted its mailing list rental activities. DAV did not use the
services of a third party to fill the rental orders but instead directly provided the
list renter with the names, either on computer disk or on a variety of preprinted
labels, for which DAV charged extra. 163 DAV devoted two man-years to the
64
rental activity each year and did not use volunteers or unpaid workers.
165
Sometimes, the rate cards were sent to list brokers to find potential list users.
The list broker would work on a commission basis--the broker would receive a
certain percentage of the rental price-and DAV would bill the list broker
156. Disabled Am. Veterans v. United States, 650 F.2d 1178, 1180 (Cl. Ct. 1981) (citing to
the trial judge's opinion).
157. See id. at 1182 (explaining the background of DAV).
158. See id. (stating facts).
159. Id.
160. See id. at 1184 (explaining the rental practice).
161. Id. at 1184-85.
162. Disabled Am. Veterans v. Comm'r, 94 T.C. 60 (1990).
163. See id. at 65 (explaining the medium of delivery); see also Disabled Am. Veterans v.
United States, 650 F.2d 1178, 1184-85 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (same).
164. DisabledAm. Veterans, 94 T.C. at 66.
165. See DisabledAm. Veterans, 650 F.2d at 1184 (explaining the use of list brokers).
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DAV reserved the right to examine
directly. 66 As is standard in the industry,
67
renter.'
list
the
by
mailed
the materials
The court concluded that DAV's rental of its mailing list was a trade or
business, holding that if an activity is conducted in a competitive, commercial
manner, it is a trade or business for purposes of the unrelated business income
tax.' 68 The court found that there was an active direct mail industry with its
own set of trade practices and that DAV was a participant in the industry.
DAV set its mailing list rentals at competitive rates, charging higher rates to
organizations for which the list had greater value and69charging additional fees
for additional services, such as sorting by zip code.1
The court gave short shrift to DAV's assertion that its mailing list rental
income was exempt as a royalty, dismissing the argument at the end of the
opinion as follows:
[S]ection 512(b) excludes from taxation the conventional type of passive
investment income traditionally earned by exempt organizations (dividends,
interest, annuities, real property rents).... DAV's list rentals are the
product of extensive business activity by DAV and do not fit within the
types of "passive" income set forth in section 512(b). The "royalties" there
referenced are those which constitute passive income, such as the
compensation paid by a licensee to the licenser for the use of the licensor's
patented invention,. . . or the share of production reserved to the owner of
property for7germitting another to work mines and quarries or drill for oil
or gas ....
In rendering its decision that DAV engaged in a trade or business, the
Court of Claims focused not only on the extent of DAV's activities but on the
fact that DAV charged competitive rental rates for the mailing list. 171 However,
that factor would not distinguish between a trade or business and an
investment. An investor would want to receive a competitive rate of return on a
dividend or interest payment. Profit motive underlies both the operation of a
trade or business and investment activities and distinguishes hobbies from
trades and businesses or investments. Profit motive does not transform
investment activity into a trade or business.
166. See DisabledAm. Veterans, 94 T.C. at 65 (explaining the list broker process).
167. See DisabledAm. Veterans, 650 F.2d at 1185 n. 14 (explaining the right to examine).
168. See id. at 1187 (setting forth the standard for determining whether a particular activity
is a trade or business). The court also held that the unrelated business income tax is not
restricted to those situations where unfair competition has been established. Id.
169. See id. at 1187-88 (pointing out DAV's activities that subjected it to the unrelated
business tax).
170. Id. at 1189.
171. See id. at 1187 (highlighting the competitive aspects of the rates).
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In response to the Court of Claims' decision, Congress enacted I.R.C.
Section 513(h) in 1986,172 which provides that an unrelated business or trade
does not include the rental or exchange of mailing lists between I.R.C. Section
501 organizations to which contributions are deductible under I.R.C. Section
170.173 The legislative history makes it clear that no inference was to be drawn
as to whether revenues derived from rentals or exchanges between
174
organizations other than those stated above are unrelated business income.
Shortly after the Court of Claims' decision in DA VI, the Internal Revenue
Service issued Revenue Ruling 81-178 setting forth two situations to
demonstrate when unrelated business income is taxable.175 Both situations
involve a tax-exempt organization of professional athletes. In the first, the
organization solicits and negotiates with a commercial enterprise for the
licensing of the organization's trademark and tradename, and athletes' names,
photographs, likenesses, and facsimile signatures in connection with the
business's sale of merchandise and services. 176 The organization retains the
right to approve the quality and style of the products and services that will
display the licensed items. 177 In the second situation, the athletes are required
to make personal appearances and give interviews in connection with the
78
business's sale of its products and services.
The Internal Revenue Service's position was that the income in both
instances was unrelated business income; however, the income in the first
situation was exempt as royalty income. The income in the second situation
was taxable because the exempt organization was obligated to perform personal
services for the commercial enterprise. 79 Significantly, the Internal Revenue
Service defined royalty income as arising from the use of a valuable intangible
property right.'80 The Revenue Ruling does not make mention of "passive"
income from "conventional" investment type sources such as dividends or
interest.I11 It is also significant that the tax-exempt organization was permitted
172. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1601, 100 Stat. 2085, 2766-67.
173. Id.
174. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 99-841 (1986); STAFFOFTHE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATON,
99TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, at 1325 (Comm. Print
1987).
175. Rev. Rul. 81-178, 1981-2 C.B. 135 (1981).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 136.
179. Id. at 137.
180. Id. at 136.
181. Id.at 135-37.
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to solicit and to negotiate the contracts and retained the right to review the
associates' products and services without jeopardizing the classification of the
income as royalty.18 2 The Internal Revenue Service apparently recognized that
the tax-exempt organization must perform some activities or services in order to
exploit its intangible property. This seems inconsistent with the Internal
Revenue Service's position in DAV I and DAV II, discussed below, when the
Internal Revenue Service argued that the tax-exempt organization's business
activity with regard to the licensing of the intangible property right-the
mailing list-meant that the income was not "passive" in nature and, therefore,
not royalty income.
DAV then resisted the Internal Revenue Service's attempts to assess a tax
on the mailing list income for the 1974-1983 tax years, and filed suit in the Tax
Court. 83 DAV argued that it was not collaterally estopped from litigating its
tax liability because Revenue Ruling 81-178 was a significant legal
development that allowed the court to reconsider the taxability of mailing list
rental income.'84
The Tax Court found virtually the same facts as the Court of Claims
regarding DAV's maintenance and rental activities; however, the Tax Court
decided that the rental income was exempt under I.R.C. Section 512(b). 8 5 The
court determined that DAV's principal purpose underlying its list maintenance
activities was to assist DAV with its own fundraising efforts. 186 Segmenting
the list by zip code, for example, enabled DAV to take advantage of bulk
mailing rates; segmenting the list by amount of contribution allowed DAV to
target certain donors with specialized appeals for contributions. 8 7 By taking
such measures as segmenting and regularly updating the list, DAV reduced its
fundraising costs and satisfied the standards set by the Council188of Better
Business Bureaus and the National Charities Information Bureau.
The Internal Revenue Service argued that all this activity-maintaining
and providing rate cards, using employees for the rental activities, organizing
the list into segments, reviewing any solicitation material sent to donors by
renters, and regularly renting the list-indicated that the rental income was not
royalty income. 8 9 The Internal Revenue Service reasoned that royalties must
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id. at 135.
Disabled Am. Veterans v. Comm'r, 94 T.C. 60 (1990).
Id. at 69.
Id. at 72.
Id. at 78.
Id. at 63.
Id.
Id. at 73.
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be "passive," and these rental payments were not passive because of all the
activity in which DAV engaged; therefore, the payments were not royalties. 190
The court held that the Internal Revenue Service was confusing the factors
that would determine if an activity is a trade or business with whether the
income is a royalty.' 91 "A taxpayer may license an intangible asset and expend
a great deal of effort to make the intangible asset valuable, but the payments
received for the use of the intangible asset are nevertheless characterized as
royalties."192 Taking steps to preserve or to increase an asset's value would not
transform a payment from being a royalty into something else. The list
continues to be intangible personal property. 193 Many of DAV's actions that
the Internal Revenue Service argued made the list appealing to renters were
undertaken for the primary purpose of maintaining a productive195fundraising list
194
The benefit to renters was incidental.
for its own purposes.

Further, the Tax Court rejected the Court of Claims' contention in DAVI
that I.R.C. Section 512(b) only excluded royalty income from "passive"
sources, and noted that "Congress has distinguished between passive royalties
and those derived from the active conduct of a business in other statutory
language of the Code but not in [I.R.C.] [S]ection 512(b)(2)."196 The Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the Tax Court on the ground that the
Court of Claims' decision collaterally estopped DAV from litigating
in the Tax
197
Court whether mailing list income was exempt from taxation.
The Tax Court subsequently had the opportunity to decide the royalty
exemption issue in SierraClub, Inc. v. Commissioner 98 (Sierra Club I). Sierra
Club was a Section 501 (c)(4) organization that derived substantial income from
1985 through 1987 from the rental of mailing lists and the licensing of its name
and logo on affinity cards. 199 Sierra Club I is the Tax Court's decision
rendering summary judgment on the issue of the mailing lists. 2° ° Sierra Club

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id. at 71.
Id. at 73-74.
Id. at 74.
Id. at 72.
Id.at 78.
Id.
Id. at 75.
See generally Disabled Am. Veterans v. Comm'r, 942 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1991).
Sierra Club, Inc. v. Comm'r, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 2582 (1993).
Id. at 2583-84.
Id. at 2592.
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11,201 which will be discussed later, is the Tax Court's summary judgment

decision on the affinity card issue.20 2
Sierra Club operated its mailing list rental business in a manner very
similar to the situations in DAV I and DAV II, with one very important
distinction: Sierra Club did not use its own employees to maintain or market
the mailing list or to fill and bill for rental orders. Instead, Sierra Club
employed a list manager and list broker to market its mailing lists and employed
an independent computer service to fill the requests, although Sierra Club
retained the right to review requests or any materials renters would be mailing
and to approve the mailing schedule.20 3 In DAV I and DAV 1I the parties and
the courts scrutinized Disabled American Veterans' activities to determine if
they were the operation of a trade or business or the exploitation of a valuable,
intangible property interest. In Sierra Club I, the exempt organization itself
was not performing most of the activities; 2 04 therefore, the Internal Revenue
Service shifted its focus to the nature of the property interest, arguing that "in
using the term 'royalties' in I.R.C. Section 512(b)(2), Congress had in mind
only 'investment income', and intended20the
term 'royalties' in that section to
5
character."
that
of
income
only
describe
The Tax Court accepted DAVIs definition of"royalties" as payments for
the use of valuable, intangible property rights 2°6 and continued to disagree with
the Court of Claims that I.R.C. Section 512(b)(2) refers only to royalties from
"passive" sources. 2°7 Instead, the Tax Court continued to maintain the position
it had taken in DAV 11 "that Congress did not intend to exclude from I.R.C.
20 8
Section 512(b)(2), royalties derived from carrying on a trade or business.v
The Internal Revenue Service ostensibly abandoned its earlier argument
that Congress intended to draw a distinction between "passive" and "active"
income, 2°9 but instead argued that Congress intended to exclude only
"investment" income by citing the legislative history in support of its
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Sierra Club, Inc. v. Comm'r, 103 T.C. 307 (1994).
Id. at 344.
SierraClub, Inc., 65 T.C.M. at 2585-86.
Id. at 2583.
Id. at 2586.
Id. at 2587.
Id. at 2586. Interestingly, the Tax Court did not cite or rely on Revenue Ruling 81-

178 either to support its position that a royalty is defined as a valuable property right or to rebut
the Internal Revenue Service's position that royalty income must be passive to be exempt. Id. at
2587.
208. Id. at 2585.
209. Id. at 2586.
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position.21 0 Specifically, the Internal Revenue Service referred to the Senate
Finance Committee report discussing the proposed enactment of what would
become I.R.C. Sections 512 and 513 where it was stated in pertinent part:
Dividends, interest, royalties, most rents, capital gains and losses, and
similar item are excluded from the base of the tax on unrelated income
because your committee believes that they are "passive" in character and
are not likely to result in serious competition for taxable businesses having
similar income. Moreover, investment-producing incomes of these types
have long been recognized as a proper 21
source
of revenue for educational
1
and charitable organizations and trusts.
The Tax Court dismissed the Internal Revenue Service's position not,only
as a restatement of the passive-active argument already rejected by the court
and abandoned by the Internal Revenue Service in Revenue Ruling 81-178, but
also as not supported by the legislative history. 212 The Tax Court reviewed the
House Ways and Means Committee report 2l and other language contained in
the Senate Finance Committee report,2 14 and noted that the legislative history
could be interpreted as merely stating that investments producing incomes such
as dividends, interest, and royalties are proper for educational and charitable
organizations. 2" Further, both reports stated that income other than investment
income was within the purview of the exception to unrelated business income
contained in I.R.C. Section 513(b)(2):
All dividends, interest, annuities, and royalties... are excluded from the
concept of unrelated business net income. This exception applies not only
to investment income, but also
21 6 to such items as business interest on overdue
open accounts receivables.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit 217 determined that the dispute centered on
the issue of the proper definition of a royalty. 218 After reviewing both
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate and Black's Law Dictionaries, the court
determined that a "royalty" is "a payment made to the owner of property for

210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Id.
Id. at 2587 (quoting S. REP. No. 81-2375, at 506 (1950)) (emphasis added by court).
Id. at 2587.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 81-2375, at 560 (1950); H.R. REP. No. 81-2139 (1950)).
Sierra Club, Inc. v. Comm'r 86 F.3d 1526 (9th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 1530.
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permitting another to use the property."' 219 The Internal Revenue Service
argued that the definition needed to be refined further to include only royalties
that are "passive" in nature. 220 After reviewing prior decisions such as DAV I
and Revenue Ruling 8 1-178, the appellate court determined that royalties must
be passive in nature in the sense that they do not include payment for
services.221 Because Sierra Club did not perform the list maintenance and
marketing services directly but used independent third parties, the court held
that the income from the mailing list rentals was royalty and, therefore,
exempt.222 Thus, the court laid the groundwork for continued argument over
the amount of activity an exempt organization can perform with regard to
royalty income before it no longer would be deemed "passive., 223 The court
rejected the Internal Revenue Service's contention that an exempt organization
could perform no services,224 yet it did not indicate the nature and frequency of
the services that an exempt organization could perform before jeopardizing the
status of the income.
B. Affinity CardLicensing Agreements
The Tax Court also rendered summary judgment for Sierra Club on the
affinity card issue (SierraClub 1/).225 In Sierra Club I, the Internal Revenue
Service conceded that the income from the mailing list rentals could be
considered royalties but not the kind of royalties that Congress intended to
exempt from the unrelated business income tax. In SierraClub II, the Internal
Revenue Service argued that the income from the affinity cards was not royalty
income at all, but rather profits from either a joint venture or sole
proprietorship.
An affinity card program works as follows: An exempt organization, such
as Sierra Club or a university, enters into an agreement with a financial
institution permitting it to use the exempt organization's name and logo on
credit cards issued by the financial institution. These cards are marketed to the
219. Id. at 1531.
220. Id. at 1532.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 1536.
223. See generally Jennifer Anne Spiegel, Note, Sierra Club: Rationalizingthe Royalty
Exception to the UnrelatedBusiness Income Tax, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1697 (1995).
224. Sierra Club, Inc. v. Comm'r, 86 F.3d 1526, 1535 (9th Cir. 1996).
225. See Sierra Club, Inc. v. Comm'r, 103 T.C. 307, 344 (1994) (finding no issue of
material fact as to whether the income received by Sierra Club was considered royalties under
I.R.C. § 512(b)(2)).
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exempt organization's members, usually by using the mailing list. The
financial institution pays the exempt organization a fee based on a certain
percent of the total purchases made by the consumer. Sometimes the exempt
organization uses the services of a third party to find an appropriate financial
institution and to solicit the members to sign up for the card. In that case, the
financial institution usually pays the third party a fee, and the third party in turn
gives the exempt organization a portion of the fee.
Sierra Club entered into a typical affinity card agreement with a third party
and a bank. Sierra Club did not pay tax on the monies earned from the
arrangement, reasoning that they were exempt as royalties. The Internal
Revenue Service argued that the monies received were taxable on the ground
that Sierra Club and the other parties entered into a joint venture because they
"agreed to share.., the revenues.., received from merchants when individual
holders of [Sierra Club] credit cards made purchases. ' 226 The Tax Court
examined the factors used to determine the existence of a joint venture,
including mutual control over and responsibility for the venture, and the most
significant factor, a mutual proprietary interest in the net profits.227
When the consumer makes a purchase with the card, the financial
institution is liable to the vendor for payment. Because the vendor's risk of loss
from an uncollectible account is minimal and the vendor is assured of prompt
payment, vendors give the financial institution a discount, typically three
percent. However, the financial institution incurs some costs, such as overhead
and the risk of uncollectible accounts. The financial institution will have a net
profit if these costs do not exceed the three-percent discount.228
The Tax Court determined that Sierra Club did not have a proprietary
interest in the net profits; Sierra Club was entitled only to contingent
compensation based on total cardholder sales.229 Although the agreements
226. Id. at 320.
227. Id. at 323; see also id. at 324 (stating "that the 'central feature' of ajoint venture is 'a
proprietary interest in the net profits of the enterprise coupled with an obligation to share its
losses"' (quoting Federal Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. Comm'r, 66 T.C. 283, 293 (1976), affd., 558
F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1977))).
228. The financial institution also earns a profit on the consumer's credit card purchases if
the consumer pays the financial institution interest. If the consumer pays in full the balance on
the credit card by the payment due date, the consumer will not be charged interest by the
financial institution on the purchases made. If the bill is not paid in full, however, the consumer
accesses the "credit reserve" and pays the financial institution interest on the balance. Again,
the financial institution will earn a net profit if its costs are less than the interest the consumer
pays.
229. See Sierra Club, Inc. v. Comm'r, 103 T.C. 307,327-28 (1994) (stating that the books
and records were inconsistent with the Internal Revenue Service's determination of a joint
venture).
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provided for some adjustment in the percentage that the Sierra Club would
receive, Sierra Club was insulated from risk of loss. 230 If the bank's cost of
funds increased, the vendor discount decreased, or if cardholders failed to pay
their accounts, Sierra Club continued to receive a certain percentage.231
Conversely, if the bank was able to increase its profits by negotiating a higher
vendor discount or decreasing its costs, Sierra Club did not share in the
increase. 232 Sierra Club did not share in the risks or the rewards of the credit
card program.
The Tax Court also found it significant that the parties had discrete, not
mutual, responsibilities.23 3 Sierra Club retained control over its name and logo;
the third party promoter was responsible for soliciting and marketing; and the
2 34
bank had complete discretion whether to accept an application for a card.
The provision in the various agreements that the parties would cooperate with
each other did not amount to mutual control.2 35
IV. The Neglected Analogy Between Mailing List Rental and Affinity Card
Arrangement and Overriding Royalties
A. Legislative History Does Not DistinguishBetween Types of Royalties
When Congress first enacted the unrelated business income tax provisions
in 1950, it believed that an exempt organization could earn certain types of
income without posing a danger to competition. The reports of the Senate

230. See id. at 333-34 (considering factors to determine whether Sierra Club was in the
business of selling financial services).
231. See id. at 325 (finding that Sierra Club did not "bear a share of either (1) ... [the] cost
of funds, (2) losses on account of uncollectible accounts, or (3) any direct or overhead costs").
232. See id. at 326 (discussing Sierra Club's rewards and obligations under the agreement).
233. See id. at 329 (finding no delegation of authority to manage the affinity card program
evidencing a partnership).
234. See id. at 312, 319 (setting forth some terms of the agreement).
235. Id. at 329. The Tax Court also rejected the Internal Revenue Service's sole

proprietorship argument. The Internal Revenue Service argued that Sierra Club was engaged in
the business of marketing credit cards, with the promoter acting as the Sierra Club's agent.
Therefore, the Sierra Club was using its name and logo in its own business which does not give
rise to royalty income. The Tax Court found that the Sierra Club did not have sufficient control
of the promoter's actions to render it the Sierra Club's agent. Therefore, the promoter's actions
could not be imputed to Sierra Club to put it in the business of selling credit cards. The
promoter had proposed the arrangement to Sierra Club, not vice versa. In addition, Sierra Club
dealt with the promoter at arms' length on such matters as the promoter advertising the
availability of the credit cards for a standard fee in Sierra Club's magazine.
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Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means Committee 236 reflect
Congress's belief that certain classes of income could be excluded from the
unrelated business income tax safely without jeopardizing competition. The
House report stated in pertinent part:
[T]he tax applied to unrelated business income does not apply to dividends,
interest, royalties ...

,

rents ...

,

and gains from the sales of leased

property. Your committee believes that such "passive" income should not
be taxed where it is used for exempt purposes because investments
producing incomes of these types have long been recognized as proper for
education and charitable purposes.237
Likewise, the Senate Finance Committee's report stated that "dividends,
interest, royalties, most rents, and capital gains and losses and similar items...
are 'passive' in character. , 238 The committees' use of the word "passive" has
bedeviled courts and commentators ever since. The legislative reports did not
define "passive income" or "royalty," nor did Congress include the word
"passive" with regard to the Section 512(b) royalty exclusion from income.239
This is particularly significant because Congress has made distinctions with
regard to royalties derived 24from the active conduct of a trade or business in
other sections of the Code. 0
The Internal Revenue Service has made two slightly different arguments
when arguing that royalty income from mailing lists and affinity cards is
taxable: (1) if the income is not derived from conventional investments, then
the income is not a royalty; 241 or (2) royalty income may be derived from
conventional investments, or from the conduct of a trade or business, but
Congress only intended to exempt the former kind.242 In making either
236.

S. REP.No. 81-2375 (1950); H.R. REP. No. 81-2319 (1950).

237. H.R. REP. No. 81-2319, at 38 (1950).
238. See S. REP. No.81-2375, at 30 (1950) (noting that those items are excluded from the
base of the tax on unrelated income).
239. See I.R.C. § 512(b) (2000) (setting forth the modifications of subsection (a)).
240. See, e.g., id. § 954(c)(2) (providing in part that "[f]oreign personal holding company
income shall not include rents and royalties which are derived in the active conduct of a trade or
business"); id. § 543(a)(1)(C) (providing in part that "[t]his paragraph shall not apply to...
active business computer software royalties").
241. See Disabled Am. Veterans v. United States, 650F.2d 1178, 1189(1981) (finding that
the defendant's list rental income was not "passive" and was therefore not considered a royalty);
Disabled Am. Veterans v. Comm'r, 94 T.C. 60, 71 (1990) (setting forth the Internal Revenue
Service's argument that because the petitioner's income was an active business, it was not a
royalty).
242. See Sierra Club, Inc. v. Comm'r, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 2582, 2586 (1993) (setting forth
the Internal Revenue Service's argument that Congress intended only "investment income" to be
considered "royalties").
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argument, the Internal Revenue Service and some of the courts have engrafted a
"passivity" requirement onto the statutory exceptions and have cited the above
legislative history as evidence of congressional intent.
The Internal Revenue Service and the courts have read too much meaning
into the legislative history's use of the word "passive." The legislative history
clearly reflects congressional dissatisfaction with exempt organizations
operating going concerns such as manufacturing enterprises or retail stores that
were indistinguishable from businesses operated by commercial entities.243
Congress equally was concerned with not sweeping into the unrelated business
income tax income derived from sources that Congress believed did not pose
threats to competition.2 " Some of the testimony from the congressional
hearings 245 reflects Congress's struggle to differentiate between an
entrepreneurial concern such as the C.F. Mueller Co. and other business
activity. Congress employed the terms "active" and "passive" in an attempt to
differentiate between an exempt organization's operation of a going concern
competing in the commercial sector, which should be taxed, and other business
activities, such as, but not exclusively, investments, which should not be taxed.
However, the record does not support the argument that Congress intended the
word "passive" to have some special or technical meaning that discriminated
between types of exempt income.
Vance Kirby, Tax Legislative Counsel with the Treasury Department, in
his testimony during the congressional hearings, attempted to draw a distinction
between the targeted activities and activities that would remain exempt:
Some of the organizations now exempt from the corporate income tax
under section 101 of the Internal Revenue Code, such as charitable and
educational institutions and social clubs, were granted exemption because
Congress desired to encourage their particular altruistic or group-interest
activities, which generally were not conducted for profit. However,
nowhere does it appear that Congress contemplated that such organizations
would engage in the active conduct of a business.
The practice has spread in recent years, particularly among charitable and
educational institutions, and a wide variety of business activities have been
engaged in by such organizations. Thus it is found that these exempt
organizations engage in the manufacture of automobile accessories,
ceramics, food products, leather goods, and chinaware.
243.
244.
245.

See generally S. REP. No. 81-2375 (1950); H.R. REP No. 81-2319 (1950).
See generally S. REP. No. 81-2375 (1950); H.R. REP No. 81-2319 (1950).
HearingsBefore House Comm., supra note 8.
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It is therefore recommended that the unrelated business activities of
charitable and educational organizations, business leagues, labor unions,
and social clubs be subject to tax at the ordinary corporate rate. A similar
proposal was presented to the committee in 1942; since that time the abuse
has spread.

Under the proposal, the traditional sources of income of these institutions,
consisting of interest, dividends, rents, royalties, or capital gains would
remain exempt.246
Representative Hale Boggs (D-Louisiana) made the prescient observation
that the tax on unrelated business income could be interpreted as including all
business income and sought assurance from Thomas J. Lynch, General Counsel
to the Treasury Department, that such would not occur:
Mr. Boggs: I am simply trying to get information and I am genuinely
concerned, because it seems to me that if you can start off with unrelated
business activities, that the logical extension is to say that revenue derived
from owning real estate or stocks and bonds is also an unrelated business.
Mr. Thomas Lynch: I would not agree to that. We would have it
specifically provided as to
247 investment income, rent, and royalties, there is
no question whatsoever.

Representatives Walter A. Lynch (D-New York) and J.M. Combs
(D-Texas) also questioned Thomas Lynch as to the focus and breadth of
the unrelated business income tax:
Mr. Walter Lynch: The only point that is involved here, as I see it, from
your recommendation, is whether or not an established business, which,
say, has been in competition with other established businesses, has been
taken over by an educational institution and operated by the educational
institution, should in their competitive business have a 38 percent
advantage over other people in the same line of business.
Mr. Thomas Lynch: That is entirely the genesis of the proposal.

Mr. Combs: Take this situation in my State: The State University and
Texas Agricultural and Mechanical share in it, on a very large body of land;
246.
247.

Id. at 165.
Id. at 176.
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part of the permanent endowment; a good deal of that is oil leased and
some in oil production.... Would the royalties received or proceeds from
the operations of these oil properties be affected by the tax change you are
proposing?
Mr. Thomas Lynch: They would not be affected by our proposal. Our
proposal excludes investment income, which would be returns on
ownership of securities, rents, royalties.
Mr. Combs: It would only pertain to business ventures and operations?
Mr. Thomas Lynch: Correct.248
The hearings do not support the inference that Congress was attempting to
differentiate or had even thought about any potential differences within the
category of tax-exempt income items. In other words, Congress used the term
"passive" to differentiate between two broad categories of business activity
(entrepreneurial-type going concerns and investment-type business activity),
but not to differentiate between types of income within one of the two
categories.

B. Are Royalties Derivedfrom a Trade or Business?
The Tax Court's analysis in Sierra Club I contains the implicit assumption
that royalty income is income from a trade or business, but that I.R.C. Section
512(b) exempts that income from taxation. 249 The Tax Court supported its
position by examining the structure and interaction of I.R.C. Sections 512(a)
I.R.C. Section 512(a) includes all items of income from an
and (b).25
unrelated trade or business, regardless of the item's nature (for example,
profits, interest, or royalties). 25 However, I.R.C. Section 512(a) does not also
o eto
252
The focus of Section
include royalties from a related trade or business.
253
512(a) is on unrelated, as opposed to related, trade or business income.
248. Id. at 176-77.
249. Sierra Club, Inc. v. Comm'r, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 2582, 2583 (1993) (noting that
§ 512(b)(2) excludes royalties from tax imposed on UBTI).
250. See id. at 2585 (stating that this court previously "made it clear that Congress did not
intend to exclude from Section 512(b)(2) royalties derived from carrying on a trade or
business").
251. See I.R.C. § 512(a)(1) (2000) (defining "unrelated business taxable income" for
purposes of the subsection).
252. See id. (including only royalties for unrelated income).
253. See id. (setting forth definitions in relation to "unrelated business taxable income").
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I.R.C. Section 512(a) does not sweep into the unrelated business income tax all
business income, but only income from an unrelated trade or business. I.R.C.
Section 512(b) then modifies I.R.C. Section 5 12(a) by excluding from its reach
certain items of unrelated trade or business income, such as royalties.254
Therefore, the Tax Court reasoned, if the royalties did not arise from (1) a trade
or business (2) that is unrelated, they would not need to be excluded from
I.R.C. Section 5 12(a) by means of I.R.C. Section 512(b). 25 In other words, the
royalties must be derived from an unrelated trade or business or they would not
need to be excluded from the unrelated business income tax by I.R.C. Section
512(b).
However, the Tax Court might be reading too much into the interplay of
I.R.C. Sections 512(a) and 512(b)(2). It is clear from the legislative history that
Congress did not want certain types of income to be subject to the unrelated
business income tax.256 Its decision to provide in I.R.C. Section 512(b) that
certain kinds of income will not be subject to the unrelated business income tax
does not necessarily mean that Congress had concluded that those items of
income were derived from a trade or business, whether related or unrelated.
Congress's intention simply was to ensure that those items were not taxed;
Congress could do so without necessarily having to decide whether in fact the
items would have been subject to the tax. Congress has done this in other
sections of the Code. For example, I.R.C. Section 62(a)(4) provides that
expenses associated with the production of rental or royalty income may be
deducted from gross income257 as opposed to less favorable treatment as
254. See id. § 512(b) (excluding certain items from taxation).
255. See Sierra Club, Inc. v. Comm'r, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 2582, 2587 (1993) (concluding
that this was the intent of Congress). However, it is interesting to note that § 512(b) excludes
interest and dividends, yet no one argues that interest and dividends are derived from the
operation of a trade or business but rather are considered investment income. In other words,
§ 512(b) excludes items of income that are not trade or business income.
256. S. REP. No. 81-2375 (1950); H.R. REP. No. 81-2319 (1950).
257. I.R.C. § 62(a)(4) provides as follows:
(a) GENERAL RULE.-For purposes of this subtitle, the term "adjusted gross
income" means, in the case of an individual, gross income minus the following
deductions:
(4) DEDUCTIONS ATTRIBUTABLE TO RENTS AND ROYALTIES.-The
deductions allowed by part VI (sec. 161 and following), by section 212 (relating to
expenses for production of income), and by section 611 (relating to depletion)
which are attributable to property held for the production of rents and royalties.
I.R.C. § 62(a)(4) (2000). The taxpayer will get the full benefit of the deduction because the
taxpayer may deduct the rent and royalty expenses directly against the gross income in order to
calculate adjusted gross income. Although investment expenses usually are itemized deductions
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itemized deductions. 258 (Trade or business expenses are deducted from gross
income whereas investment expenses are itemized deductions.). However,
Congress was not necessarily taking the position that rental and royalties are a
trade or business. Congress is free to exercise its prerogative to have those
expenses treated as if they arose from the operation of a trade or business and,
therefore, deductible from gross income 259 without necessarily having to make a
determination as to whether royalties are trade or business, investment, or some
other kind of income.
The structure of I.R.C. Section 512 and its supporting regulations appear
to recognize that differences exist between dividends and interest, which no one
would argue are not investment income, and rents and royalties, the status of
which is not as clear. I.R.C. Section 5 12(b)(1) exempts dividends and interest
from the unrelated business income tax; I.R.C. Section 512(b)(2) exempts
royalties. They are not lumped together, but are addressed separately.
Similarly, Treasury Regulation Section 1.512-(b)(1)(a) addresses the treatment
of dividends and interest; 1.512-(b)(1)(b) addresses royalties; and 1.512(b)(1)(c) addresses rents. Neither the statute nor the regulation lumps them
together as "investment income," treating them as a monolithic category. This
also reflects Congress's uncertainty as to the exact nature of royalties, and we
simply may be unable to determine if they are fish or fowl-business or
investment income. Therefore, it is a useless exercise to attempt to resolve their
status under the unrelated business income tax on that basis.
A more fruitful approach would be to compare these "new" royalties to
traditional mineral rights royalties, which no one disputes are exempt from the
(I.R.C. §§ 67, 68, 212) that receive less favorable treatment because they are not deducted in
full, Congress permits taxpayers to deduct expenses associated with rents and royalties directly
against gross income, treating them as trade or business expenses. Congress does not
distinguish between investment and trade or business expenses in this situation.
258. I.R.C. §§ 63(d) and 212 permit a taxpayer to deduct, as an itemized deduction,
investment expenses. I.R.C. § 63(d) allows the taxpayer to deduct itemized deductions in lieu
of the standard deduction; therefore, the taxpayer will only itemize the deductions if their total
amount exceeds the standard deduction. I.R.C. §§ 67-68 impose additional limits on the
amount that the taxpayer may deduct.
259. See, e.g., Lewyt Corp. v. Comm'r, 349 U.S. 237, 240 (1955) (concerning
congressional power to allow deductions). The Court writes:
Congress may be strict or lavish in its allowance of deductions or tax benefits. The
formula it writes may be arbitrary and harsh in its applications. But where the
benefit claimed by the taxpayer is fairly within the statutory language and the
construction sought is in harmony with the statute as an organic whole, the benefits
will not be withheld from the taxpayer though they represent an unexpected
windfall.
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unrelated business income tax. Congress excluded these traditional royalties
for a reason. Something about their nature or derivation did not raise concerns
about unfair competition. The question then becomes, are these new royalties
generated in a manner that is similar to traditional royalties? If so, this would
be a workable and appropriate method for classifying the new royalties for
purposes of determining whether they should be exempt from the unrelated
business income tax. 2 °
C. The SimilaritiesBetween Affinity Card and Mailing List
Arrangements and Overriding Royalties
1. Mineral Royalties in General
Mailing list rental and affinity card arrangements operate in a manner
similar to overriding royalties from mineral, oil, and gas leases. I.R.C. Section
5 12(b)(2) removes royalties, including overriding royalties, from the unrelated
business income tax.261 The term "royalty" with regard to mineral, oil, and gas
leases can be defined as a share of the product or profit reserved by the
landowner for permitting the lessee to use the property. 262 An "overriding
royalty" usually refers to an interest carved out of the lessee's share, as opposed
260. It is arguable that this approach could be applied to all items of income to determine
whether it is appropriate to exclude them from the unrelated business income tax under
§ 512(b). Mineral rights royalties are divided into a taxable working interest, which bears the
risk and benefits of the venture, and the exempt investment interest held by the nonprofit. This
distinction between a working interest and an investment interest really is at the heart of the
exemptions for interest and dividend income from the unrelated business income tax.
261. I.R.C. § 512(b)(2) (2000). The statute states:
There shall be excluded all royalties (including overriding royalties) whether
measured by production or by gross or taxable income from the property, and all
deductions directly connected with such income.
Id.
262. See 58 C.J.S. Mines and Minerals § 289 (1998) (offering several definitions for
royalty). It also offers the following definitions:
It has also been defined as the amount reserved or the rental to be paid the original
owner of the whole estate; the compensation for the privilege or right created by the
lease; the compensation provided for the privilege of drilling for oil and gas,
consisting of a share in the oil and gas produced under existing leases; a
participation in the proceeds derived under the terms of the lease; the share of the
product or profit paid to the owner of the property ....
Id. (citations omitted). In Sierra Club, Inc. v. Commissioner, the Ninth Circuit employed a
similar definition: "[R]oyalty commonly refers to a payment made to the owner of property for
permitting another to use the property." Sierra Club, Inc. v. Comm'r, 86 F.3d 1526, 1531 (9th
Cir. 1996).
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263
The lessee may choose to
to the landowner's or lessor's interest or royalty.
will be responsible
which
interest,
working
(1)
a
into
interest
lease
divide the
the oil and
marketing
and
for the actual business operations such as developing
gas, and (2) an overriding royalty. For example, in return for a royalty, a
landowner might enter into an agreement with a lessee in which the lessee
agrees to develop and produce oil and gas from deposits on the landowner's
property. The lessee in turn might enter into an agreement with a third party
who will actually perform the work and pay the lessee an overriding royalty.
The third party has a working interest; the lessee will be entitled to an
overriding royalty. Both a royalty and an overriding royalty are nonrisk and
265
noncost bearing interests. 264 In Garmon v. Conoco, Inc. the court explained
the various interests:

The fundamental purpose of an oil and gas lease is to provide for the
exploration, development, production and operation of the property for the
mutual benefit of the lessor and lessee .... The lessor relinquishes its right
to the mineral estate in exchange for a smaller non-risk and non-cost
bearing royalty interest in any mineral discovered .... Similar to a royalty,
an overriding royalty is an interest in oil and gas produced at the surface,
free of expense of production, generally assessed in addition to the usual
mineral owner's royalty.... Though their contractual origins may differ,
both royalty and overriding royalty interests are non-risk and non-cost
bearing interests....
Though a lease is entered into for the mutual benefit of the parties, not all
parties participate equally in lease development decisions. Royalty and
overriding royalty interest owners (nonworking interest owners) defer to the
risk-bearing parties (working interest owners) to decide when and where to
drill, the formations to be tested and ultimately whether to complete a well
266
and establish production.

263. See 58 C.J.S. Mines and Minerals § 289 (1998) (describing "overriding royalty"); 38
AM. JUR. 2d Gas and Oil § 215 (1999) (defining overriding royalty). American Jurisprudence
writes:
An overriding royalty has also been defined as a certain percentage of the working
interest which, as between the lessee and the assignee, is not charged with the cost
of development or production. An overriding royalty is similar to a royalty in that
both are nonrisk and noncost bearing interests ....
Id.
264. See 58 C.J.S. Mines and Minerals § 289 (comparing an overriding royalty and a
royalty).
265. Garmon v. Conoco, 886 P.2d 652 (Colo. 1994).
266. Id. at 656-57.

62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 547 (2005)
2. Mineral Royalties and the UnrelatedBusiness Royalty Exception
With regard to tax-exempt organizations, Treasury Regulation Section
1.512(b)- 1(b) specifically provides for the exclusion of mineral royalties from
the unrelated business income tax, with the caveat that an exempt organization
holding a working interest and not relieved from its share of development costs
cannot exclude the income.26 7 The Internal Revenue Service in a Technical
Advice Memorandum further explained the working interest must not be able
to look to the tax-exempt organization for reimbursement or liability for
operating or development expenses in order for the tax-exempt organization to
268
be able to exclude any income as an overriding royalty.
Section 1.512(b)-1(b) of the regulations, in conjunction with Rev. Rul. 69179, indicates that a mineral interest is a royalty interest for purposes of
section 512(b)(2) of the Code if the holder of the mineral interest is not
liable for the expenses of development or operations. The holder of a
mineral interest is not liable for the expenses of development or operations
within the meaning of section 1.512(b)-i (b) where the holder's interest is a
net profit interest not subject to expenses which exceed gross profits.269
What is key is that the tax-exempt organization is relieved of all risks and
expenses associated with the exploitation of the intangible.
Sierra Club's risk and responsibilities under the affinity card program
were similar to those of a holder of an overriding royalty with the bank or
promoter serving as the working interest. Sierra Club was not responsible for
the expenses associated with marketing the card but rather had a nonrisk,
noncost bearing interest. 27° In addition, the bank or the third party promoter
was responsible for the day-to-day operations of the program, not Sierra Club;
the program's success depended on their efforts, not Sierra Club's. 27 1 Sierra
267. Treas. Reg. § 1.512(b)-l(b) (2004). The regulation states in pertinent part:
Royalties, including overriding royalties... shall be excluded in computing
unrelated business taxable income .... Mineral royalties shall be excluded
whether measured by production or by gross or taxable income from the mineral
property. However, where an organization owns a working interest in a mineral
property, and is not relieved of its share of the development costs by the terms of
any agreement with an operator, income received from such an interest shall not be
excluded.

Id.
268.

Tech. Adv. Mem. 77-41-004 (1977).

269.

Id.

270. Sierra Club, Inc. v. Comm'r, 103 T.C. 307, 325 (1994) ("None of the agreements
provide that petitioner is to bear a share of either (1) Chase Lincoln's cost of funds, (2) losses

on account of uncollectible accounts, or (3) any direct or overhead costs.").
271.

See id. at 326-27 (discussing the limits of Sierra Club's duties, obligations, and
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Club's receipt of royalty payments depended on the bank's and the promoter's
marketing efforts, not Sierra Club's.
The rationale the Tax Court employed in Sierra Club It for distinguishing
affinity card arrangements from joint ventures parallels the rationale for
distinguishing between working interests and overriding royalty interests. The
Tax Court looked to which party bore the risk of loss or rewards and which
party was responsible for development and marketing, which in the mineral
lease area would indicate which party held the working interest. The Tax Court
found that the bank or the promoter shouldered the risk of loss, not Sierra
Club.27 2 Further, the Tax Court found that the bank or the promoter was
responsible for soliciting and marketing the affinity cards; Sierra Club did not
273
share control over those activities.
Likewise, with regard to Sierra Club's mailing list rentals, the parties'
respective risks and responsibilities could be divided between a working
interest and an overriding royalty. Again, Sierra Club was dependent on the list
manager's and list broker's successful efforts to rent the list. The list manager
and list broker had the responsibility for the day-to-day activities associated
with renting the list, such as finding potential renters.274 If they were
unsuccessful or if their expenses exceeded their commissioners, they bore the
risk of loss, not Sierra Club.275
3. The Working Interest, the Royalty Interest, and Services
In Robert A. Welch Foundationv. United States276 the plaintiff was a taxexempt trust (Foundation) that received a significant portion of its funds from
opportunities under the contract).
272. Id. at 326-27. The court wrote:
Significantly, petitioner did not share any of the credit risk borne by Chase Lincoln.
Also, petitioner did not share in (1) any of Chase Lincoln's direct costs or overhead
costs, or (2) any of the costs of solicitation borne by [the third party promoter].
Petitioner bore no costs (other than its own).... Simply put, petitioner's
participation in the financial risk and reward factors.., was too limited to
constitute a mutual proprietary interest in the net profits of that activity. The...
agreement entitled petitioner to contingent compensation, measured in chief by
total cardholder sales volume.
Id.
273. Id. at 328 ("[The promoter] is made responsible for the development of promotional
and marketing materials and programs.").
274. Sierra Club, Inc. v. Comm'r, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 2582, 2583 (1993).
275. Id.
276. Robert A. Welch Found. v. United States, 228 F. Supp. 881 (S.D. Tex. 1963).
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two controlled subsidiaries.277 The two subsidiaries produced and marketed oil
and gas from properties on which they held oil and gas leases and paid
Foundation an overriding royalty of all of the net profits.278 With some minor
exceptions, Foundation was not responsible for any of the subsidiaries'
expenses that exceeded revenues derived from the oil and gas
leasesthe
279
subsidiaries could only look to the income for reimbursement.
The Internal Revenue Service claimed that the overriding royalties that
Foundation received were working interests, not overriding royalties, and were
subject to the unrelated business income tax.280 Foundation filed a timely claim
for a refund and prevailed. 281 The district court held that the royalties were
overriding royalties and exempt from tax under Section 512(b). Specifically,
the court held that the holder of the overriding royalty does not operate a trade
or business; the working interest, which is responsible for the day-to-day
operations of developing and marketing the oil and gas, operates a trade or
business.
An overriding royalty on oil and gas properties, such as were held by the
plaintiff under said Contracts No. 1, 2, and 3, are entirely different from
working interests owned by the holder of an interest in an oil and gas lease
who drills the wells and operates the properties for the production of oil
and gas. The owner of such a working interest is actively engaged in his
operations at all times and such operations under a working interest are
definitely the carrying on of a trade or business. This is so clear that
citation of authorities is unnecessary. On the other hand, the owner of an
overriding royalty such as was held by the plaintiff is not engaged in any
operations for the production of oil or gas. All of the operations in this
case by which the oil and gas on account of which the plaintiff received its
royalty income were carried on by [the subsidiaries]. As stated by the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Snell v. Commissioner of

InternalRevenue, 97 F.2d 891, in speaking of the meaning of "business:"

277. See id. at 882-84 (discussing the history of Mound Company and Fidelity Oil and
Royalty Company).
278. Id. at 883.
279. See id. at 884 ("Fidelity being required to look only to the income for
reimbursement.").
280. See id. at 885 ("The Commissioner ...held that said interests.., were not royalties
but were working interests.").
281. See id. at 888 (granting the plaintiff recovery for overpayment of taxes plus
prejudgment interest). The decision of the district court was upheld on appeal to the Fifth
Circuit in United States v. Robert A. Welch Found., 334 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1964).
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The word, notwithstanding disguise and spelling and pronunciation, means
business; it implies that one is kept more or less busy, that the activity is an
occupation.
The plaintiff through its ownership of these overriding royalties was not
kept busy in the sense of operating a business. Consequently, the plaintiff
was not through the ownership of these overriding royalties engaged in
such a business as comes within the meaning of unrelated trade or business
as defined by Section 513 .... 282

In part because of the Welch Foundationcase, Congress amended I.R.C.
Section 512 in 1969 by adding I.R.C. Section 512(b)(15), which provides that
an exempt organization that receives royaltiesiffeluding overriding
royaltiesfrem controlled organizations, such as subsidiaries, will pay
unrelated income tax on the royalty. 283 However, exempt organizations still
may receive income exempt from tax royalties and overriding royalties from
unrelated entities.
In attempting to resolve whether the exempt organization had derived its
income from a royalty, the courts focused on whether the exempt organization
was "too active" or whether the royalty was from "passive" activity. 285 The
courts sensed that somewhere in all that activity a trade or business existedthe issue was who was operating the trade or business. It is significant that in
DAV I and DAV II the courts spent little time focusing on the role and
responsibilities of the entities with whom the exempt organization had
contracted. 286 If the courts had studied how an overriding royalty functions,
282.

Id. at 887.

283.

See H.R. REP. No. 91-413, at 49 (1969), reprintedin 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1645, 1694

(concerning provisions of the bill). The House Report states:
In certain cases exempt organizations do not engage in business directly but do so
through nominally taxable subsidiary corporations. In many such instances the
subsidiary corporations pay interest, rents, or royalties to the exempt parent in
sufficient amount to eliminate their entire income, which interest, rents, and
royalties are not taxed to the parent even though they may be derived from an active
business.
Id. This problem is remedied under the bill by removing the exemption from the unrelated
business tax for passive income if it is in the form of interest, rents, and royalties received from
controlled corporations. Id.
284. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 77-41-004 (1977) (finding "net profits interests" to be royalties
in the context of mineral interests).
285. See, e.g., Disabled Am. Veterans v. Comm'r, 94 T.C. 60, 61 (1990) (framing the
question of unrelated business taxable income liability as turning on whether income was a
royalty or a rental).
286. See generally id.; Disabled Am. Veterans v. United States, 650 F.2d 1178 (Ct. Cl.
1981).

594
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they would have had a method or structure for sifting out and assigning the
risks and responsibilities under the contract to the appropriate party-to the
owner of the intangible or to the party wishing to use the intangible. If the
owner of the intangible (the exempt organization) does not assume
responsibility for expenses that exceed gross receipts or for the day-to-day
operations involved in marketing the intangible, the exempt organization's
interest is akin to an overriding royalty. In DA V I, the exempt organization
did not enter into a contract with a promoter but marketed the mailing list
directly to ultimate users.287 DAV directly participated in the mailing list
rental business, and, in fact, its employees devoted two man-years to the
activity. 2 88 Therefore, DAV was both the owner and the promoter of the
valuable, intangible property right. In DA V II, the Tax Court only focused on
who was the owner of the property right and did not consider who was
performing the marketing. 289 To some extent, the Tax Court in Sierra Club I
and Sierra Club II stumbled into that methodology without realizing it and
the respective parties to the
looked to the risks and responsibilities29 of
°
contract, ending up with a correct result.
287. See Disabled Am. Veterans, 650 F.2d at 1184-85 (describing DAV's practice of
renting out its mailing lists).
288. See id. at 1182 (discussing DAV's efforts to create and maintain its mailing list).
289. See Disabled Am. Veterans, 94 T.C. at 75-76 (rejecting the contention that DAV's
actions as its own marketer of its list converted a royalty into a rental).
290. However, the Tax Court did not employ this methodology of determining which party
bore the risks and was responsible for the success of the program when deciding Common
Cause v. Comm'r, 112 T.C. 332 (1999). As in SierraClub 1,Common Cause employed third
parties to market and to maintain the list and to fill rental orders. Id. at 335. Common Cause's
only direct activity (other than owning the rental list) was to review the data cards and approve
list rentals. Id. at 334-36. The Tax Court held that these actions were appropriate for the owner
of a valuable intangible to take in order to protect the value of the intangible and did not
constitute "services." Id. at 342. However, the Tax Court then considered whether the activities
conducted by (1) the computer service that actually maintained the list and filled orders, (2) the
list manager that marketed the list, and (3) the list broker that helped consummate sales were
"royalty-related activities." Id. at 342-47. These three entities all charged fees for their
services, which were included in the invoice sent to the list renter. Id. at 337. When the list
renter paid the bill, they all received payment, and Common Cause received the balance. Id.
The Tax Court held that the list broker's activities, such as coordinating the rental and collecting
payment from the renter, to remit to the list manager were not royalty-related because they were
undertaken "solely for the mailers' convenience." Id. at 346. However, the Tax Court
proceeded to hold that the computer service's activities, such as printing the list on media
chosen by the renter, and the list manager's activities, such as advertising the list to list brokers
and renters, were not services but were royalty-related activities because they were designed "to
exploit or protect [the] list." Id. at 342. It is difficult to understand the Tax Court's logic,
although clearly it did not want to determine if these activities were a trade or business: "Our
holding obviates the need to address respondent's trade or business arguments." Id. at 347.
Nevertheless, it is clear that these entities were active participants in and offered their services to
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However, it is possible for the exempt organization to have an
overriding royalty interest and also have income from services. Even if the
exempt organization has entered into a contract with another entity that has
the working interest, it is still possible for the exempt organization to have
income from services. One explanation for the differing outcomes in DA V I
and DAV 11 is that the Court of Claims focused on how DAV's activities
made the list more marketable, and the Tax Court emphasized how DAV's
activities furthered DAV' s exempt purpose. 2 9 1 Neither court, nor the Internal
Revenue Service, fully recognized that it was possible for an exempt
organization to have income from both (1) the use of property and (2) the
rendering of services. The Tax Court concerned itself with whether the
mailing list was a valuable intangible property right in light of Revenue
Ruling 81-178's more expansive view of a royalty and gave little thought as
to whether DAV also was rendering services.29 2 The Court of Claims gave
scant consideration to whether DAV was receiving income from the use of a
instead to the question of
valuable property right, directing its 29attention
3
services.
rendering
was
whether DAV
In order to determine from which source the income arises, it is
necessary to examine the exempt organization's activities and to put them
into categories. The activities can be separated into three categories:
(1) those the exempt organization would undertake regardless of whether it
rented the mailing list (for example, updating the names), (2) those necessary
and ancillary to exploit the intangible to obtain a royalty (for example,
providing a renter with a computer disk containing the names or reviewing
literature the renter intended to send to potential contributors), and (3) those
that are services solely for the benefit of the renter (for example, if DAV
were to perform the actual mailing for the renter for a fee). Admittedly, the
lines of demarcation among these three categories are not always clear. For
example, one could argue that DAV's provision of mailing labels in lieu of

the mailing list industry in return for payment. Id. at 343-44. They functioned as working
interests, and they did not act as mere royalty holders. See generally Planned Parenthood v.
Comm'r, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 2227 (1999) (consolidating the case for trial with Common Cause
and is virtually identical with Common Cause).
291. See Disabled Am. Veterans v. Comm'r, 94 T.C. 60, 73 (1990) (noting that DAV's
actions to maintain the productiveness of its list was directly related to its own ability to solicit
funds).
292. See id. at 70-71 (discussing the application of Revenue Ruling 81-178 in determining
whether the DAV's mailing list was a royalty).
293. See Disabled Am. Veterans v. United States, 650 F.2d 1178, 1189 (Ct. Cl. 1981)
(describing DAV's business activities as "extensive").
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simply providing a computer tape with the names belongs in either the
second or third category.
Both the Internal Revenue Service and the Court of Claims said that
DAV had engaged in "too much" activity. 294 They failed to recognize that the
issue is not the extent of the activity but its purpose. They did not sort the
activities into categories. The Tax Court to some extent did recognize that
the purpose underlying the activity is relevant and directed its attention
towards identifying those activities that made the list more valuable to DAV
(and only incidentally to the renters), such as updating and segmenting the
list, which would fit under the first category.295 However, the Tax Court did
not address DAV's other activities, such as providing labels for the
convenience of the renter or DAV's marketing activities, which belong in the
second and third categories. 296
The Ninth Circuit distinguished Sierra Club I and DAV I on the basis
that DAV had performed a number of the services (such as list maintenance)
directly, whereas Sierra Club had used third parties to provide rental
services. 297 The Ninth Circuit held that because Sierra Club's activities were
"far less substantial" than activities that other courts had found would prevent
a claim that income was royalty income.29 8 The Ninth Circuit mistakenly
focused on the extent of the activities or services and not on the nature or
purpose of the activities or services. 299

294. See id. at 1188 (discussing the difference between regular and intermittent activities);
see also Disabled Am. Veterans v. Comm'r, 94 T.C. 60,79 (1990) (Swift, J., dissenting) (same).
295. See DisabledAm. Veterans, 94 T.C. at 78 (describing services associated with renting
segments of the DAV list as de minimis in light of DAV's internal segmenting of its list to
increase donations for itself).
296. See id. at 73-74 (listing several factors raised by the IRS and dismissing same as
irrelevant).
297. See Sierra Club, Inc. v. Comm'r, 86 F.3d 1526, 1535-36 (9th Cir. 1996) (discussing
and distinguishing DA V I from Sierra Club 1).
298. See id. at 1536 (dismissing the IRS position that directly paying for a business service
and allowing a commission to be deducted for such services are functionally equivalent).
299. Subsequent to Sierra Club I and II, and the appeal of Sierra Club H, the Tax Court
also decided Alumni Association of University of Oregon v. Commissioner, 71 T.C.M. (CCH)
2093 (1996), Oregon State University Alumni Association v. Commissioner,71 T.C.M. (CCH)
1935 (1996), and MississippiState University Alumni v. Commissioner,74 T.C.M. (CCH) 458
(1999), two of which were appealed to the Ninth Circuit. The Oregon affinity credit card
arrangements were upheld as constituting royalty payments, based on SierraClub and the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Sierra Club. Ore. State Univ. Alumni Ass'n v. Comm'r, 193 F.3d 1098,
1100-02 (9th Cir. 1998).

TAXING NONPROFITS OUT OF BUSINESS
V. Why Taxing Mailing List and Affinity CardIncome Does Not Comport
with Good Tax Policy
A. The Harm to Competition Rationale
Both the Internal Revenue Service and the courts have scrutinized the
legislative history to determine whether Congress would have considered
affinity card and mailing list rental income to be within the royalty exception.
This scrutiny is misplaced and does not resolve the issue. I.R.C. Section 512(b)
was enacted more than fifty years ago when the United States's economy was
based on manufacturing and not services as it is today. It simply would not
have been within Congress's contemplation that the concept of a royalty could
be extended to include the property at issue because those situations did not
exist. Therefore, it is impossible to glean from the legislative history whether
Congress would or would not have included mailing list rental and affinity card
income within the unrelated business income tax. A more fruitful approach is
to consider whether mailing list rentals and affinity card income creates the
potential for the kinds of abuse that Congress intended to prohibit. Congress
was concerned that exempt organizations would engage in unfair competition,
divert resources, or enter into risky business ventures.
An exempt organization that operates a business and does not pay taxes
has lower costs that gives it an unfair advantage over commercial entities. An
exempt organization operating as efficiently as a commercial entity will have
higher profits that can be plowed back into the business to expand it. The
exempt organization also can afford to operate less efficiently than a
commercial counterpart and to remain competitive as long as the cost of the
inefficiency is less than the cost of the taxes not paid. If exempt organizations
directly engaged in the marketing of affinity cards or, as was the case in DA VI,
competed with other list brokers and list managers to market its mailing list, the
risk of unfair competition would exist. The exempt organizations could operate
more cheaply than their commercial counterparts.
However, when the affinity card or mailing list rental arrangements are
akin to overriding royalties, the exempt organization does not compete directly
against commercial enterprises. In that case, the danger of unfair competition
would exist only if the exempt organization could pass along the benefit of its
tax-exempt status to the commercial entity with which it has the arrangement,
enabling it to compete unfairly.
With regard to affinity cards, the financial institution with the affinity card
agreement would have an unfair advantage only if the institution had lower
costs as a result of the agreement and other financial institutions did not have
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access to such agreements. There is no evidence that access to affinity card
agreements is limited. More importantly, however, it is difficult to see how the
exempt organization's exempt status could enable the financial institution to
operate more cheaply. In fact, the financial institution would have increased
costs because it has to pay the exempt organization a fee. The financial
institution benefits from the goodwill associated with the exempt organization's
name, not from the exempt organization's exempt status. A consumer's
incentive to use the card arises from the consumer's desire to support the
exempt organization, not because the card is necessarily cheaper than one not
associated with the organization.
The potential for unfair competition from mailing list rentals would occur
only if the exempt organization could pass on the benefit of its exempt status
either to list brokers or to list renters who competed against brokers and renters
who did not have access to the lists. It is difficult to see how an exempt
organization could pass on the benefit of its exempt status to give list brokers or
users a competitive advantage. List brokers operate on commission, meaning
that their fees are based on a percentage of the list rental fee. 3° If the exempt
organization were to set a rental charge that was below market rates, the broker
would have less incentive to market the exempt organization's mailing list
because the broker's commission would be reduced.
Further, the exempt organization would not have any incentive to charge
less than the market rate for list rentals. Exempt organizations rent these lists to
raise funds, and therefore, the exempt organization has no incentive to rent the
list below market rates. If the exempt organization were to do so, it would fail
to collect all the revenue that would be available to it with no offsetting benefit
from having foregone the revenue. In addition, the only incentive an exempt
organization would have to restrict access to its list would be if the exempt
organization considered the renter to be incompatible with the exempt
organization's exempt purpose, but otherwise, the exempt organization would
want to rent the list as often as possible. The Court of Claims in DA VI found
that each mailing list is unique so that any one list does not compete directly
with another list for rental income.30 1 The same could be said for names and
logos on affinity cards.
Congress also was concerned that exempt organizations engaging in
unrelated trades or businesses would be diverting their resources from their

300. See supra Part Ill.A (discussing the mailing list rental industry).
301. See Disabled Am. Veterans v. United States, 650 F.2d 1178, 1187 (1981) ("While
mailing lists are each unique such that it cannot be said that any one list competes against any
other list....").
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exempt purpose, which also can raise unfair competition issues.3 °2 Frances Hill
has observed that there is an assumption that exempt organizations apply their
revenues towards their exempt purpose, but in fact, there is no way to verify
that they do.303 Because a nonprofit is prohibited from passing on its revenues
to shareholders or owners, it is assumed that the revenues are devoted to
exempt purposes, which is not necessarily the case. 3°
An exempt organization will engage in an unrelated trade or business only
if it were economically self-sufficient, that is, if the unrelated trade or business
generates sufficient revenue to cover its costs. In that case, the exempt
organization would not divert funds it derived from fulfilling its exempt
purpose, such as donations, to maintain the unrelated trade or business.
However, the exempt organization could divert funds to expand the business.
The exempt organization also could use the profits from the unrelated trade or
business to expand its operations rather than applying the funds towards
fulfilling its exempt purpose.
Mailing list rentals and affinity card arrangements that operate like
overriding royalties do not present this danger. The exempt organization's
name, logo, and mailing list have intrinsic value only because of the goodwill
of the exempt organization's supporters, and that goodwill is generated by the
exempt organization fulfilling its mission. The only way that the exempt
organization could increase the number of affinity cardholders or names on its
mailing list would be for the exempt organization to acquire more supporters;
the exempt organization gains supporters by fulfilling its mission. Affinity
cards and mailing lists are desirable only if the exempt organization fulfills its
purposes and gains supporters. There are two components to the successful
marketing of mailing lists and affinity cards-the existence of a valuable
property right and the successful development or marketing of the property
right. These two components are akin to the two interests associated with
overriding royalties-the owner of the valuable property right (the recipient of
the overriding royalty payment) and the developer or marketer of the valuable
property right (the working interest). The intrinsic value of the intangible
depends on the exempt organization fulfilling its mission; the successful

302. H.R. REP. No. 91-413, at 27 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1645, 1672
(expressing concern about potential unfair competition issues).
303. See Frances R. Hill, Targeting Exemption for CharitableEfficiency: Designing a
Nondiversion Constraint, 56 SMU L. REV. 675, 687 (2003) ("[Plart of the problem is a
pervasive assumption that revenue from all sources is used for exempt activities.").
304. See id. at 680 ("Virtually no data exist on how exempt organizations use their
resources.").
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marketing of the mailing list or affinity card depends on the respective efforts
of the list broker or the financial institution-the working interest.
B. Taxing Income Impedes Ability of Some Nonprofits To Function and
DiscriminatesUnfairly
Exempting mailing list and affinity card income from taxation does not
create the potential for harm to competition; however, subjecting that income to
taxation could have a deleterious effect on the ability of some nonprofits to
function. Taxing mailing list and affinity card income will impede the ability
of some exempt organizations to raise revenue. There is a tendency to view
exempt organizations as a homogenous group when in fact there are twentyseven separate categories of organizations with tax-exempt status, many with
nothing more in common than the fact that their earnings cannot inure to
private benefit.30 5 As discussed below, conventional revenue sources such as
fees for services or donations are more readily available to some exempt
organizations than others.
Exempt organizations derive revenues from program service revenues,
donations, government grants, membership dues, and commercial activity.
When viewed as a group, the primary source of funds for nonprofit
organizations is program service revenue, which is mostly comprised of fees
that organizations collect from the activities they operate in furtherance of their
exempt purposes. 3 6 Typical examples of program service revenue are college
tuition, museum admission fees, and hospital care charges. The bulk of
program service revenue is earned by universities and hospitals; it is the main
source of revenue for hospitals. 307 Not all exempt organizations can generate
program service revenues (for example, soup kitchens and homeless shelters).
I.R.C. Section 501(c)(3) charities now receive the bulk of private
contributions and grants. In 1995, of the almost $125 billion that exempt
organizations received from donations and grants, $119 billion went to I.R.C.
Section 501(c)(3) charities. 30 8 Given that contributors may deduct donations to
Section 501(c)(3) charities on their tax returns, it is not surprising that they are
305. I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(1)-(27) (2000). The twenty-seven subsections provide that no part
of the net earnings of the exempt organization may inure to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual.

306.

STATISTICS OF INCOME DIVISION, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE

TREASURY, 20-YEAR REVIEW OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, 1975-1995, at 153 (1999).

307.
308.

Id.
Id. at 171.
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more attractive recipients of contributors' largesse. Jennifer Anne Spiegel has
suggested that if an exempt organization cannot raise sufficient funds from
donations, perhaps it does not merit tax-exempt status. 309 However, one of the
reasons exempt organizations are formed and we support them is because they
give voice to minorities. 310 A group with substantial support from the public
has the clout to get what it wants from the private sector or the government.
Heather Gottry documents that the federal government has decreased its
financial support for exempt organizations while at the same time expecting
exempt organizations to carry out functions that formerly the federal
government performed. 311 At the same time, the number of exempt
organizations has increased dramatically in the last twenty years, and there are
now 1.2 million nonprofit organizations registered with the Internal Revenue
Service.3 12

309. Spiegel, supra note 223, at 1730. Spiegel writes:
Soliciting contributions serves a dual purpose of generating revenue and
encouraging society to contemplate the value of the services of the exempt
organization. An exempt organization's inability to muster minimal support
through charitable donations may indicate that society no longer values the services
of the exempt organization. If society no longer places a high priority on these
services, then perhaps the tax-exempt status of the organization is no longer
justified.
Id.; see also Henry Hansmann, The Rationalefor Exempting Nonprofit Organizationsfrom
CorporateIncome Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54, 72-75 (1981) (observing that donations are often
an uncertain and inadequate source of capital for nonprofit organizations).
310. LESER M. SALAMON, AMERICA'S NONPROFIT SECTOR: APRMER 11-13 (2d ed. 1999),
reprintedin JAMES J. FIsHMAN & STEPHEN SCHwARZ, TAXATION OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS

34 (2003). Salamon writes:
But in a democracy government will only supply those collective goods desired by
a majority. Where such support is lacking, another mechanism is needed, and one
such mechanism is the nonprofit sector. Nonprofit organizations allow groups of
individuals to pool their resources to produce collective goods they mutually desire
but cannot convince a majority of their countrymen to support. This can happen,
for example, when particular subgroups share certain cultural, social or economic
characteristics or interests not shared by all or most citizens of a country. Through
nonprofit organizations such subgroups can provide the kinds and levels of
collective goods they desire. The greater the heterogeneity of the population,
therefore, the larger the nonprofit sector is likely to be.
Id.
311. See Heather Gottry, Profit or Perish: Non-Profit Social Service Organizationsand
Social Entrepreneurship,6 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 249, 254 (1999) (noting the

implications of increased emphasis on nonprofit service organizations combined with reduced
federal financial support). Additionally, nonprofit organizations were "projected to lose up to
ninety billion dollars of their federal support over the fiscal years 1997-2002, including at least
a 25% reduction in overall funding for social service organizations." Id. at 255.
312.
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Exempt organizations have been forced to devise new methods for raising
funds, such as generating income from the use of their most valuable assetstheir names, logos, and mailing lists. Taxing this royalty income but not
"traditional" royalty income such as income from oil and gas leases favors
certain groups of nonprofit organizations over others, even though such
favoritism is not intended or desirable. For example, long-established colleges
have endowments that can be invested in traditional royalties. Younger schools
do not have that economic advantage but need revenue to carry out the same
function that the older schools do. Exempt organizations require a steady
stream of income in order to plan.
Affinity cards and mailing list rentals also assist exempt organizations in
the fulfillment of their respective exempt purposes in ways that are perhaps
more subtle than the direct infusion of cash but are nevertheless very real.
When a consumer acquires and uses an affinity card bearing the name and logo
of a particular nonprofit organization, the consumer displays support for and
promotes the organization's purpose. The card also keeps the nonprofit
organization's name in both the consumer's and the public's awareness, which
may increase donations or at least sensitivity to the organization's message.
The alumni organization in Oregon State University Alumni Association v.
Commissioner3 13 made such an argument when successfully resisting attempts
by the Internal Revenue Service to tax the university's affinity card income. 1 4
VI. Conclusion
Congress's and small business owners' concerns about nonprofit
organizations engaging in commercial activities is warranted; situations where
nonprofit organizations abuse their exempt status exist. However, Congress
should tread carefully if it decides to amend the unrelated business income tax
provisions to include within its sweep only those activities in which the exempt
organization is abusing its status. Affinity credit card licensing agreements and
mailing list rentals do not present the potential for abuse (unfair competition,
diversion of resources, or risky ventures) with which the 1950 Congress was
concerned. Instead, these two revenue raising activities operate very similarly
to overriding royalties, which have long been considered an appropriate
revenue source for nonprofit organizations.
1975-1995, at 150 (1999).
313. Ore. State Univ. Alumni Ass'n v. Comm'r, 71 T.C. M. (CCH) 1935 (1996).
314. See id. at 1936 (listing the association's motivations as primarily related to publicity
and only secondarily related to income).
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The working interest-the commercial entity with whom the exempt
organization has an agreement-would remain subject to tax. The nonprofit
itself, which represents the overriding royalty interest, would not be directly
competing with commercial enterprises and, therefore, would not be able to use
its exempt status to an unfair advantage. In addition, the nonprofit is not able
to pass on the benefit of its exempt status to the working interest, enabling it to
compete unfairly with other commercial enterprises.
Further, if Congress were to subject affinity credit card licensing
agreements and mailing lists rentals to taxation, it would cripple the ability of
some nonprofits to fulfill their missions. Nonprofits need to be able to depend
on a steady stream of income in order to plan effectively; however, not all
nonprofit organizations have endowments that can be invested in "traditional"
royalties but must devise new methods for generating a steady stream of
income. To permit nonprofits to receive income streams from mineral royalties,
but not from the exploitation of their valuable, intangible property, would
At the same time, such
discriminate unfairly between nonprofits.
discrimination would not protect competition.
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